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My dissertation examines the consequences of the massive infrastructure invest-
ment in China from three different aspects. In the first chapter, I examine the
distributional impacts of high-speed rail upgrade in China. By exploiting the
quasi-experimental variation in whether counties were affected by this project,
I find that relative to non-affected counties, affected counties on the upgraded
railway lines suffered a 4-6 percent reduction in GDP and GDP per capita fol-
lowing the upgrade, which can be explained largely by the concurrent drop in
fixed asset investment. In addition, since high-speed rail upgrade affects trans-
portation of passengers and not transportation of goods, the negative impact
of the upgrade is significant in the service sector and not in the manufactur-
ing sector. A possible mechanism consistent with the core-periphery model is
also discussed in this chapter. In the second chapter, I use four waves of a pri-
mary panel household survey conducted in 17 remote natural villages in China
to study how road access shapes farmers’ production patterns, input use, and
rural poverty. The results show that access to roads facilitates specialization
in agricultural production. In natural villages with better road access, farm-
ers plant fewer numbers of crops, purchase more fertilizer, and hire more la-
bor. Consequently, road connections improve household agricultural income
and reduce poverty. However, better access to rural roads does not appear to
bring about significant changes in nonagricultural income. In the third chapter,
I study whether the increasing insecurity of home ownership being reported in
the media induces urban households to save more in Chinese cities, which is
in favor of the precautionary savings motive. Using Difference GMM models,
I find that worse insecurity of home ownership, as indicated by more frequent
forced evictions, leads to higher household savings rate at the prefecture city
level. In addition, I find that the impact could work through a reduction of
home purchase due to forced evictions, as well as precautionary savings motive
of existing home owners.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Massive infrastructure investment is iconic to China’s economic develop-
ment in the past decade. My dissertation tries to understand the microeconomic
and macroeconomic consequences of infrastructure investment in China.
In Chapter 2, I examine the distributional consequences of high-speed rail
upgrade in China. As an urban-biased transportation technology, high-speed
rail connects large cities with bullet trains. However, such high-speed trains do
not stop in rural counties in order to maintain the high speed. Even worse, the
bullet trains squeeze out some conventional train services since they share the
same railroad with the slow trains after the railway upgrade. In this chapter,
I exploit the quasi-experimental variation in whether counties were affected to
examine the distributional impacts of the upgrade. More specifically, I construct
instruments for whether a county is affected and compare affected and non-
affected counties before and after the high-speed upgrade. The main results
suggest that counties being affected by high-speed rail upgrade experienced 4-6
percent GDP and GDP per capita reduction, which can explain around 64 per-
cent of the predicted GDP growth differentials between the affected and non-
affected counties. The reduction in GDP per capita is not driven by population
changes. Instead, I find that the magnitude of the reduction in fixed asset invest-
ment almost explains the reduction in GDP. Intuitively, when the cities had been
more conveniently connected by the bullet trains, investment left the counties
and crowded into the cities in pursuit of higher returns. In addition, I find that
the negative impact of the upgrade is significant in the service sector and not
in the manufacturing sector. This is reasonable since high-speed rail upgrade
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affects the passenger rail service instead of the freight rail service. I also discuss
the potential mechanisms of such impact. These findings imply that the distri-
butional implications of these types of investments can be dramatic, suggesting
that investment policies might have to be augmented by supplementary policies
designed to mitigate these distributional consequences.
In Chapter 3, I try to understand how rural road access shapes farmers’ pro-
duction patterns, input use, and rural poverty. I use four waves of a primary
panel household survey conducted in 17 remote natural villages in China to ex-
amine this question. The results suggest that access to roads facilitates special-
ization in agricultural production. In natural villages with better road access,
farmers plant fewer numbers of crops, purchase more fertilizer, and hire more
labor. Consequently, road connections improve household agricultural income
and reduce poverty. The first two chapters provide important policy implica-
tions for China. In the past several decades, the Chinese government has made
significant investments in building nationwide highway and high-speed rail
systems. As the highway and high-speed rail density increases, the marginal
returns to such investments are likely to decrease. In addition to that, the dis-
tributional consequences of highway and high-speed rail investment may exac-
erbate the urban-rural disparities in China. Therefore, it may make more eco-
nomic sense to gear investment toward local road construction (such as rural
road) in areas lack of transportation infrastructure.
In Chapter 4, I study the macroeconomic consequences of a rising social
problem due to infrastructure investment in China: forced evictions. As local
governments have been aggressively investing in infrastructure, the residen-
tial areas targeted by such investments need to be demolished. Therefore, the
2
incidences of forced evictions have been increasing dramatically both at the in-
tensive (more cases in the same area) and extensive (more areas being affected)
margin in recent years. The number of news about forced evictions by search-
ing Baidu News Archive, the world’s largest Chinese news search engine, rose
from 307 in 2004 to 125,000 in 2012. However, there is no paper studying the
potential consequences of such rising social problem in China as far as is con-
cerned. Previous literature suggests that home ownership in China is associated
with reduced household savings (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). It is thus interest-
ing to investigate whether owning a home with expropriation uncertainty due
to forced evictions will induce households to save more. I use the annual in-
cidence of forced evictions reported in the news at the prefecture city level to
measure the frequency of forced eviction from 2004 to 2011, which is collected
from Baidu News Archive. The household savings rate is collected from the
CEIC database for the same time period. By employing the dynamic panel data
model, I find that worse insecurity of home ownership, as indicated by more
frequent forced evictions, leads to higher household savings rate at the prefec-
ture city level. In addition, I find that the impact could work directly through a
reduction of home purchase due to forced evictions, or indirectly through pre-
cautionary savings behavior of existing home owners.
3
CHAPTER 2
“NO COUNTY LEFT BEHIND?”: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF
HIGH-SPEED RAIL UPGRADE IN CHINA
2.1 Introduction
Infrastructure investments are regarded as key instruments to promote overall
economic growth. However, such investments are not evenly distributed across
different regions of a country, possibly due to differences in expected returns,
budget constraints, planning concerns, and so on. For example, in the most re-
cent highway construction boom in China, the highway length per capita in the
affluent Guangdong Province quadrupled from 2003 to 2010, while it increased
by only one fourth in the relatively underdeveloped Guizhou Province during
the same period.1 Therefore, the regions or sectors more “local” to investments
(such as Guangdong Province) may benefit more than less-affected regions or
sectors (such as Guizhou Province). The distributional consequences will be
even more pronounced if investments biased toward one sector or region hurt
less-affected sectors or regions.
In this chapter, I explore this possibility by investigating the distributional
impacts of one such infrastructure investment: high-speed rail upgrade in
China. There are several reasons why this is a useful case to study. First, invest-
ment in high-speed rail is prevalent in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Currently, more than 10 countries in the world have high-speed rail, in-
cluding Spain, Japan, Germany, France, China, the United States, Belgium, Italy,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Korea, Taiwan (China), and Turkey (UIC,
1China Statistical Yearbooks, 2004-2011.
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2010). As well, a number of other countries, such as India, Russia, Brazil and
Canada, plan to upgrade their railway lines into high-speed rail (UIC, 2010).
China is a very relevant country to study high-speed rail’s impact since such
investment in the country is very large in scale. Among all the infrastructure
investment in China, investment in railroads takes up to 23 percent with a high
growth rate in recent years.2 The annual investment in the railroad sector in
year 2010 (around 120 billion US Dollars) was more than ten times that of the
investment in 2003 (around 10 billion US Dollars). A large proportion of invest-
ment in the railroad sector was for high-speed rail upgrades on existing railway
lines and the construction of new high-speed rail. After the high-speed rail up-
grade in 2007, the total length of high-speed rail reached 6,000 kilometers in
China, top in the world even today.
Second, like all such investments, high-speed rail upgrades in China are
known to favor urban areas. High-speed rail, by definition, is a type of pas-
senger rail transport that travels at speeds above 200 kilometers per hour. In
order to maintain the high speed, the featured service of high-speed rail, the bul-
let trains, stop only in populous urban areas, where there are higher demands
for time savings, in contrast with small cities and rural areas. Thus, counties
with upgraded railway lines may find bullet trains bypassing them (Economist,
2011). Indeed, as suggested by Figure A.1, around 3,000 out of around 6,100
passenger train stops in China have been abandoned in the past ten years due
to the speed acceleration of passenger train services, especially after year 2004,
when high-speed rail upgrading began. That is to say, even though the high-
speed trains help facilitate economic activities across cities due to significantly
less travel time, they may actually hurt the small counties along the acceler-
2China Statistical Yearbooks, 2004-2011.
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ated railway lines by passing them by and depriving them of access. In the
urban planning literature, this is known as the “tunnel effect,” defined as “an
improvement in access to major cities but at the expense of breaking up the
space between them. The increase in dynamism in large nodes is compensated
by a decrease in the activity of areas between the connection points” (Albalate
and Bel, 2012). The latest World Bank report on China’s high-speed rail de-
velopment also documents the fact that some conventional train services were
removed after the introduction of high-speed rail (Bullock et al., 2012).
Third, whether the non-targeted counties have been affected by the upgrade
process has been quasi-random to a large extent, which facilitates credible em-
pirical analysis on the causal impact of high-speed rail upgrade on such affected
counties. The two rounds of high-speed rail upgrade, parts of China’s railway
speed acceleration project since 1997, were implemented in the year 2004 and
2007. There are two reasons why the upgrade has been quasi-random for the
affected counties. First, all the upgrades were implemented on existing railway
lines, which mitigates the concern of the selection problem on high-speed rail
placement. Second, as the selection for high-speed rail upgrade mainly depends
on which large cities the existing railways are connected to, the counties in be-
tween cities affected by the speed acceleration can be regarded as quasi-random
since they were not selected on purpose (Michaels, 2008; Datta, 2012).
I exploit this quasi-experimental variation in whether counties were affected
to examine the distributional impacts of the upgrade. Specifically, I examine the
impact of high-speed rail upgrade by comparing the economic outcomes of the
counties located on the affected railway lines with the counties located on non-
affected railway lines, before and after, using county level statistics collected
6
from statistical yearbooks and other published statistical reports. I first apply a
difference-in-difference setting in order to compare the high-speed rail affected
counties and non-affected counties, before and after. The common trend as-
sumption required by difference-in-difference analysis satisfies since the pre-
trends of outcome variables are similar between control and treatment groups.
To strengthen my estimation, I also instrument the selection of affected counties
by whether a county is located on the five main railway lines in China (four lines
connecting Beijing to the north: Haerbin; south: Guangzhou and Hong Kong;
east: Shanghai, while one connects Lianyungang in the east to Urumqi in the
west). The assumptions for the instrumental variable estimation are that coun-
ties located on the main railway lines are associated with a higher likelihood
of being selected into high-speed rail upgrades, while their placement on main
railway lines affects economic development only through the impact on speed
acceleration. Even if counties located along the main railway lines are selected
due to their greater economic potential, it will only bias my estimate downward
as I expect the counties located on the accelerated railway lines are negatively
affected in the later period of the project.
My analysis conveys several main findings. First, the estimations using OLS
and Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) consistently suggest that being located on
the high-speed railway lines decreases a county’s total GDP and GDP per capita
by 4-6 percent on average, which is around 336-503 million yuan (54-81 million
US Dollars), given the average county level GDP as 8.39 billion yuan (around
1.35 billion US dollars) in 2006 in the affected regions. In addition, the negative
impact due to high-speed rail upgrade can explain around 64% of the predicted
GDP growth rate differentials right after the upgrade between the affected and
non-affected counties. The results still hold if I collapse the panel data from
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multiple years into two periods, i.e., “pre” and “post,” following the suggestion
of Bertrand et al. (2004) on correctly estimating the standard errors in difference-
in-difference analysis. Such implies that the urban-biased investment of high-
speed rail upgrades hurt the economic growth of non-targeted counties located
on the upgraded railways.
Second, the reduction of GDP is likely to be investment driven, as evidenced
by the 10-11 percent reduction of fixed asset investment in the affected coun-
ties. This is not surprising since investment is a driving force of GDP growth
in China (Qin et al. 2006; Yu, 1998). Intuitively, when the cities had been more
conveniently connected by high-speed trains, investment left the counties and
crowded into the cities in pursuit of higher returns due to expected growth. The
result still holds for robustness checks.
Third, the impact of the railway upgrade varies in different sectors. Since
high-speed rail significantly reduces transportation cost of passengers rather
than goods, its negative impact in the affected counties is more pronounced in
the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. More precisely, the growth
rate of service sector value added is reduced by 3-4 percent after the high-speed
rail upgrade, while the growth rate of industrial sector value added is not sig-
nificantly affected.
Fourth, I discuss the channels that may account for the investment-driven
economic slowdown in the affected counties. Specifically, I test two possible
channels: 1) increases in trade cost due to reduced train services in the affected
counties may lead to decreases in economic activities; 2) increases in agglomer-
ation spillovers with a more tightly connected transportation network between
large cities may divert economic activities from counties to populous urban dis-
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tricts. I find that the second channel plays a more important role in explaining
the negative impact of high-speed rail upgrade.
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, to my knowledge,
this is the first paper documenting the distributional consequences of high-
speed rail projects to the non-targeted rural areas, which complements the rich
body of literature examining the causal relationship between access to infras-
tructure and various aspects of economic development in both developing and
developed countries (Ahlfeldt, 2011; Atack et al. 2010; Banerjee et al. 2009,
2012; Baum-Snow 2007; Baum-Snow et al. 2012; Donaldson 2013; Donald-
son and Hornbeck 2013; Duflo and Pande 2007; Faber 2013; Zheng and Kahn,
2013). Specifically, this paper provides the first set of results demonstrating an
investment-driven GDP reduction in the non-targeted rural areas affected by in-
frastructure investment. Second, the main findings of this paper provide an em-
pirical test to the core-periphery model (Fujita et al. 2001), especially its recent
development by introducing the service sector (Leite et al. 2013). The evidence
in this paper suggests that the periphery rural areas may experience a reduc-
tion in service sector output when transportation cost decreases. Third, this
paper also provides useful insights in understanding the increasing rural-urban
disparity in China in the past few decades, where urban biased infrastructure
investment may have played a role (Kanbur and Zhang 2005; Xu 2011).
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the policy back-
ground of high-speed rail upgrade in China. Section 2.3 describes the identifi-
cation strategy and data sources. Section 2.4 shows the main findings and ro-
bustness checks. Section 2.5 discusses the heterogeneous impacts of the railway
upgrade in different sectors, possible channels the impact may work through
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and the magnitude of such impact. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background of China’s High-Speed Rail Upgrade
2.2.1 Railway network in China
China is the third Asian country to adopt a railroad system, after Japan and
India. The first railroad in China, constructed in the year 1876 by the British,
was a local railway near Shanghai. During the 73 years after the first railroad in
China and before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, around 23,000
kilometers of railroad were constructed in China. However, half of them were
destroyed during World War II.
In 1949, railroad construction resumed and has been emphasized in almost
all of China’s “Five-Year Plans.” By the late 1990s, the operating railroad length
had been increased to around 66,000 kilometers, with six main railway lines
connecting several largest cities in different parts of the country: 1) Beijing-
Shanghai (jinghu xian); 2) Beijing-Haerbin (jingha xian); 3) Beijing-Guangzhou
(jingguang xian); 4) Beijing-Hong Kong (jingjiu xian); 5) Lianyunguang-Urumqi
(longhai-lanxin xian); 6) Beijing-Baotou (jingbao xian).
In late 2002, the new Minister of Railways, Zhijun Liu, proposed his “Great
Leap Forward” strategy, which encouraged further expansion of the railroad
network and many technology upgrades, including high-speed rail upgrades
and construction (Liu, 2003). The Mid-long Term Railway Network Plan enacted
by the State Council in 2005 set the goal of expanding railroad length to 100,000
10
kilometers by the end of 2020, which was further revised to 120,000 kilometers
in the year of 2008, with a budget of around 4,000 billion yuan (State Council,
2004, 2008). By the end of 2007, all the provinces in China had been connected
with railroad networks, as suggested in Figure A.2. However, it is clearly shown
that the railroad coverage in the west, the relatively poor area, is significantly
lower than in the east.
2.2.2 Railway speed acceleration and high-speed rail upgrade
Mainly in response to the profit loss under the competition of road and air trans-
portation, China’s Railways Ministry started several rounds of speed accelera-
tion on existing railway lines spanning from 1997 to 2007. The project had two
stages. In the first stage, train speed was increased gradually in the first four
waves, namely 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001. In 1997, the first round of speed ac-
celeration was initiated on three main railway lines connecting from Beijing to
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Haerbin. The average passenger train speed was
increased from around 48.1 kilometers per hour to 54.9 kilometers per hour.
Subsequently in 1998, 2000 and 2001, another three waves of speed acceleration
were implemented on the main railway lines, increasing the average train speed
nationwide to 61.6 kilometer per hour by the end of 2001.
In the second stage, speed acceleration was targeted towards upgrading the
existing railway into high-speed rail, with sustained speed greater than 200 kilo-
meters per hour or higher. In 2004, around 1,960 kilometers of railroad had
been upgraded to high-speed rail, with 19 pairs of city-to-city nonstop passen-
ger trains operating on it. In 2007, the upgraded high-speed rail was expanded
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to around 6,000 kilometers with 257 pairs of China Railway High-speed (CRH)
trains operating on a daily basis, which significantly shortened the commut-
ing time between large cities. For example, the travelling time from Beijing to
Fuzhou, the provincial capital of Fujian in the south of China, was reduced from
around 33 hours to 19.5 hours with the introduction of CRH trains in 2007. The
travelling time by train was reduced by more than half from Shanghai to Nan-
chang and Changsha, which are the two provincial capitals in southeast China.
According to the vice Minister of the Chinese Railways Ministry, the travelling
time between cities by CRH trains was reduced by an average of 20-30 percent
(Sina 2007).
The dramatic expansion of high-speed rail in the year 2007 reflects the “Great
Leap Forward” strategy proposed by the ex-Minister of the Chinese Railways
Ministry, Zhijun Liu, who was removed due to corruption allegations in early
2011. During Liu’s tenure, China invested a huge amount of money into railway
expansion, upgrades, and construction of high-speed railway lines. As most of
the high-speed railway lines were updated from existing railways, some slow
train services on the upgraded lines were canceled in order to accommodate
CRH trains. As a consequence, the number of operating slow trains signifi-
cantly decreased with the increase of high-speed rail mileage. For example, in
2002—before high-speed rail upgrade—352 pairs of daily slow passenger trains
operated nationwide. The number dropped to 224 in 2007.3
Even though high-speed rail benefits transportation from city to city, it may
do harm to the economy of the small counties along the upgraded high-speed
railway lines through two possible channels. First, the affected counties lose
3There is no significant difference in terms of capacity between high-speed rail passenger
trains and normal passenger trains. A typical passenger train contains 16-20 coaches, with a
capacity of 110 passengers in each coach.
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their geographic advantage in the transportation network, leading to increases
of transportation cost. Specifically, counties located on the high-speed railway
lines experienced a reduction of slow train services on the upgraded high-speed
rail route. Even though the total number of train services might not have de-
creased if the affected counties utilized other conventional railway lines as well,
the number of train services still decreased in relative terms compared to the
counterfactual without high-speed rail upgrade; i.e., some of the slow train
services on the affected railway lines were not canceled. Therefore, due to in-
creased transportation cost, the affected counties become less integrated, and
economic activities decline in response to the increase in trade barriers.
Second, since the high-speed rail connects large cities more tightly, the eco-
nomic activities in cities may generate more agglomeration externalities. There-
fore, some economic activities in small counties may be diverted to large cities
in order to enjoy the agglomeration spillovers. Both the above-mentioned chan-
nels lead to lower economic returns to railroads in those places, which affects
the overall economic performance.
2.2.3 Program placement
In this chapter, I focus on the high-speed rail upgrade in 2004 and 2007.4 As up-
grading existing railway lines for speed acceleration is costly, not all the railway
4As mentioned in 2.2, there were four rounds of speed acceleration in 1997-2001 before the
high-speed upgrade. We will not focus on that since the scale of the project is small compared to
the 2004 and 2007 high-speed upgrade. None of the railway lines in China had been upgraded
to high-speed rail before 2004. An impact evaluation on the speed acceleration in 1997-2001
using difference-in-difference is shown in Table B.12, which suggests little impact of the four
rounds of speed-up on economic performance in the affected counties. However, in order to
ensure a cleaner identification, I exclude the observations from 1997 to 2001 in the control group
when estimating the impact of high-speed rail upgrade in 2004 and 2007.
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lines were selected for upgrade. In 2004, the three main railway lines connecting
Beijing to Haerbin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were partially upgraded to high-
speed rail, with around 20 pairs of nonstop bullet trains operating on them (Fig-
ure A.3). Later in 2007, the upgrading was completed on the above-mentioned
three railway lines and on two additional main lines (Lianyungang to Urumqi
and Beijing to Hong Kong,) as well as four other regional lines (Hangzhou to
Zhuzhou, Guangzhou to Shenzhen, Wuhan to Jiujiang, and Qingdao to Jinan,
Figure A.4).
In general, the priority of high-speed rail upgrade was given to the main
railway lines first, as they connect big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou, which generate huge demand for railway transportation. Besides
the main lines, several regional railway lines were selected for upgrade, as they
pass through regions of high economic growth, such as the Pearl River Delta
Region (Guangzhou to Shenzhen) and the affluent regions in Zhejiang Province
(Hangzhou to Zhuzhou). I will argue in the next section that while these place-
ment patterns were not random, they still facilitate credible identification strate-
gies.
2.3 Data and identification
2.3.1 Identification strategy
The goal of this chapter is to reveal the distributional impact of high-speed rail
upgrade in China. Specifically, the urban biased high-speed rail upgrade may
hurt the economic growth of non-targeted counties/regions when it improves
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the connection between urban areas. In order to test the above hypothesis, the
difference-in-difference strategy is applied to compare the counties located on
the affected railway lines to the counties located on other railway lines, before
and after each round of high-speed rail upgrade. It is worth emphasizing that all
the urban districts in prefecture level cities have been excluded from the sample
since they are likely to be selected on purpose in the high-speed rail upgrade
projects.
The key assumption in difference-in-difference analysis is common trend. In
this case, it would be violated if counties in the control group and treatment
group have different growth patterns prior to high-speed rail upgrade. To test
the common trend assumption, I use an event study analysis to show that the
control group and treatment group have similar pre-trend in terms of GDP, per
capita GDP and fixed asset investment before the upgrade process. More details
about the event study are discussed in Section 2.4.3.
A problem posed by difference-in-difference analysis is the non-random
placement of the treatment group. That is, in our context, the placement of high-
speed rail upgrade is not randomly selected. However, the quasi-experimental
nature of high-speed rail upgrade at the county level renders the non-random
placement problem much less a concern for two reasons. First, all the upgrades
were implemented on existing railway lines, which mitigates some of the con-
cerns in the selection problem of high-speed rail placement.5 Second, as the se-
lection of affected railway lines mainly depends on the cities it connects, rather
5In addition to high-speed rail upgrade, China also constructed new high-speed rails, such
as high-speed rail from Beijing to Shanghai and Wuhan to Guangzhou. In observance to the fact
that the earliest new high-speed rails started to operate in December 2009, I exclude the county
statistics after year 2009 in the estimation to avoid the possible intertwined impact of new high-
speed rails and high-speed rail upgrade due to network effect. In addition, the counties being
affected by newly constructed high-speed rails are also excluded from the estimation.
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than the counties it bypasses, it can be treated as a quasi-natural experiment
for the counties located on railway lines. This argument is similar to that of
Michaels (2008) and Datta (2012), both of whom argue that if a highway is built
to connect two cities, it must pass through areas that lie between the two, which
affects the outcomes in such areas as a quasi-random shock. However, for re-
gional lines which pass through only a few counties and cities, the decision to
select the railway lines for high-speed rail upgrade may also depend on the
counties they cross. Such counties may in fact bias my estimation.
Therefore, I employ an instrumental variable to identify the program selec-
tion. Specifically, I use whether a county is located on the main railway lines to
identify whether it is affected by the speed acceleration or not. As mentioned
in Section 2.2.1, there are six main railway lines in China. I exclude the railway
line from Beijing to Baotou (jingbao xian) in the identification strategy since it
mainly serves freight trains instead of passenger trains, which are not relevant
for high-speed rail upgrade.6,7 The five main railway lines are shown in Figure
A.3 and A.4.
The validity of the instrumental variable requires two assumptions: (1) be-
ing located on the main railway lines is correlated with being affected by the
high-speed rail upgrade and (2) being located on the main railway lines affects
economic growth only through its impact on railway acceleration. The first as-
sumption holds, which can be shown from the high-speed rail upgrade map in
Figure A.3 and A.4. All the five main railway lines have been upgraded to high-
speed rail since they connect the largest cities in China. In addition to the main
6One may doubt the definition of main railway lines in China. However, the definition here
follows the published train schedule, where each main railway line is a section of the schedule.
Therefore, the definition is objective.
7The railway line from Beijing to Baotou mainly serves to transported coal from Shanxi
Province, the largest coal-production base in China, to other provinces.
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railway lines, several regional lines have also been upgraded as shown on the
map. The second assumption is somewhat stronger since the main railway lines
are often located in relatively developed regions. However, even if counties lo-
cated along the main railway lines are selected due to their greater economic
potential, it will only bias my estimate downward as I expect the counties lo-
cated on the accelerated railway lines are negatively affected in the later period
of the project.
The estimation equation of a standard difference-in-difference can be ex-
pressed as:
Outcomei,t =β0 + β1HSRi ∗ A f tert + γYeart ∗ Provincei
+ δCountyi + i,t (2.1)
where Outcomei,t is the economic outcome of county i in time t. In this chapter,
I am most interested in two categories of outcome variables: (a) yearly county
level GDP and GDP per capita, which represent the overall performance of a
county and (b) a yearly county level investment measure, i.e., fixed asset in-
vestment, which is important because investment is a driving force of GDP
growth in China (Qin et al. 2006; Yu, 1998).8 HSRi ∗ A f tert is the difference-
in-difference term, where the dummy variable HSRi denotes whether county i
was affected by high-speed rail upgrade (in 2004 and 2007) or not; and A f tert
denotes whether it is before or after the high-speed rail upgrade for each time t.
Yeart ∗ Provincei controls for year by province time trend.9 Countyi controls for
8Fixed asset investment includes the investment in capital construction, investment in ren-
ovation and renewals of existing facilities, investment in real estate development, investment
in other fixed assets by state-owned units, investment in other fixed assets by collective-owned
units, private investment in housing construction as defined by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China.
9I can also use year fixed effect instead of year by province fixed effect here if the assumption
is released so that there is no heterogeneity in terms of growth trend across different provinces.
The main findings do not change if year fixed effect is used.
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county fixed effect. i,t is the error term.
The reduced form instrumental variable estimation can be written as:
Outcomei,t =β0 + β1Mainlinei +
∑
αtMainlinei ∗ Year dt
+ γYeart ∗ Provincei + δCountyi + i,t (2.2)
where Mainlinei denotes whether county i is located in any of the five main
railway lines or not; Mainlinei∗Year dt denotes Mainlinei interacting with a series
of year dummies. Other variable definitions are the same as in Equation (2.1).
It is worth noting that our sample is restricted to counties with a railroad at
the beginning of our sampling period (year 1996). As county train stations also
vary by size, we further exclude 98 out of 957 counties which own “large train
stations” due to their historical importance in the railway system, as they might
have also been considered important connections in the high-speed rail route.10
However, the estimation results change little even if we include the counties
with “large train stations.”
2.3.2 Railroad data
In order to estimate the impact of high-speed rail upgrade in year 2004 and 2007
on counties being affected, I compare the economic performance of counties
located on the upgraded railway lines to the counties located on conventional
railway lines before and after high-speed rail upgrade, from year 2002 to 2009.
Therefore, the railway status information of all the counties in China as of year
10Passenger train stations have been categorized into six levels according to their size and ca-
pacity, namely VIP stations and level one to level five stations. We denote “large train stations”
as train stations above level three according to the standard in the 1990s.
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2008 is collected from the People’s Republic of China Railroad Atlas published in
2008. A dataset including the list of counties with access to railroad in 2008 is
constructed based on the above information, along with the name of the railway
line(s) on which each county is located. In addition, I identified the railroads
being constructed in each year from 1996 to 2007 along with its bypass counties
from the annually published China Railroad Yearbook. I excluded from the
sample such counties that did not have railroad access until year 1996, since
the positive economic impact of a relatively new railroad may contaminate our
estimation of high-speed rail upgrade on existing railway lines.
In addition to county railroad status, the frequency of daily passenger train
stops in each county during 1996-2009 is also collected for descriptive pur-
poses. The information is manually compiled from the published passenger
train schedules in each year. Each train stop is matched to its county using the
China Train Station Encyclopedia, published in 2003. The train stops not listed in
the book are matched by online resources. It turns out that only a very small
proportion of train stops (around 100 out of 6,000 stops) cannot be matched to
its county, as these counties are very small in size in most cases. Because those
small stations are generally serviced by very few trains, this fact little affects my
descriptive statistics.
Figure A.1 shows the number of operating passenger railway stations from
1996 to 2009. Around 3,000 passenger train stations were closed during the
ten years of speed acceleration, especially during the high-speed rail upgrade
(starting in 2004). More surprisingly, the number of counties with functioning
passenger train stops is also decreasing, even with the expansion of new rail-
way lines, as suggested in Figure A.5. Hence the number of counties that have
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lost train service recently has exceeded the number of counties with new ac-
cess to railroads. In contrast, the accessibility of railroads in cities has slightly
increased.
Figure A.6 shows the average daily train stops in each city and county dur-
ing 1996-2009. It is clear that train service is much more frequent in cities than
in counties. The average number of daily train stops is around 70-90 times for
cities during 1996-2009, compared to merely 20-30 times for counties. Further-
more, after 2004, the average number of daily train stops indicates a decreasing
trend for counties but an increasing trend for cities, in accordance with the fact
that the train stations in small counties were skipped after the introduction of
high-speed rail.
Figure A.7 and A.8 provide the distribution of average daily train stops in
counties in 1996 and 2007, respectively. Two stylized facts can be revealed from
those maps. First, the accessibility to trains is distributed unequally across coun-
ties in both years. The county with the least accessibility to railroad had only
one daily train stop in 1996, while the county with the most accessibility had
345 daily train stops. However, in 2007, the county with the most accessibility
to railroad service had 165 train stops, a 50 percent reduction from 1996. Second,
the accessibility to trains decreased during the speed acceleration. The median
of daily train services is 18 trains per day in 1996 and 14 trains per day in 2007.
The two color-coded maps illustrate the decline in average accessibility to trains
that accompanied the speed acceleration that occurred between 1996 and 2007.
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2.3.3 County statistics data
The county statistics dataset is collected from the China Economic and Social
Development Statistical Database provided by China National Knowledge In-
frastructure (CNKI), which is compiled from all the publicly available statis-
tical yearbooks and other published statistical reports.11 All the counties and
county-level cities in China have been included in the analysis except (1) coun-
ties administered by the four municipalities, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,
and Chongqing, as they are directly governed by the municipalities and are too
close to the start of main railway lines, and (2) counties in Tibet, as none of them
had access to railroad until 2007, which makes it unnecessary to include them in
the sample based on my identification strategy. Therefore, a total of 1,878 coun-
ties are included in the sample for descriptive purposes, with information on
county GDP, GDP per capita and fixed asset investment. However, only coun-
ties with train access before 1996 are included in my estimation as mentioned in
Section 2.3.2. There are 957 counties for estimation purposes. The time span of
the county statistics is from 2002 to 2009.
People may have some concerns about the quality of GDP data in China.
However, as suggested by Au and Henderson (2006), the GDP and other eco-
nomic indicators at the local level are indeed of high quality. Since our unit of
analysis in this paper is at the county level, there should be little concern that
the results are driven by the quality of the data.
11The database is available at http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Dig/dig.aspx with institutional
access.
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2.4 Findings
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1 shows the descriptive statistics for county level railway status and eco-
nomic outcome indicators. As mentioned in the previous section, only counties
with a railroad before 1996 are included. Thus, a total of 957 counties have been
included in the sample, with 171 of them located on five main railway lines and
786 located on other railway lines. On average, in year 2003, around 28 trains
stopped in counties located on main railway lines on a daily basis, compared to
around 22 trains stopping in counties located on other railway lines. However,
in 2007, both numbers dropped, from 28 to 21 and from 22 to 18, respectively.
This is evidence that the reduction in train service accessibility is more severe
for counties located on main railway lines than for others. In terms of economic
outcomes, counties located on main railway lines on average have higher GDP,
GDP per capita, and fixed asset investment. The GDP doubled from 2003 to
2007 for both groups of counties. The fixed asset investment almost tripled for
both groups.
2.4.2 Difference-in-difference (OLS) estimation
Table B.2 shows the OLS regressions for the impact of high-speed rail upgrade in
2004 and 2007. Estimation results are reported for two sub-samples: 2005-2009
(which is tested for the high-speed rail upgrade in 2007) and 2002-2009 (which
is tested for the high-speed rail upgrade in both 2004 and 2007). The OLS es-
timation using difference-in-difference specification generally suggests that the
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high-speed rail upgrade, especially in year 2007, hinders economic develop-
ment in the affected counties. Column 1-4 of Table B.2 suggests a significant
GDP and GDP per capita reduction after the high-speed rail upgrade in 2007 in
the counties located on the affected railway lines, which is around 4-5 percent in
magnitude.12 However, the impact of earlier upgrade in 2004 is not significant
with a negative magnitude in Column 2 and 4. The insignificant coefficient can
be explained by two facts. First, the mileage of high-speed rail upgrade in 2004
is 1,960 kilometers, which is only one third of the completed upgrade in 2007
(around 6,000 kilometers.) Second, only 19 pairs of nonstop city transit trains
were operating on the upgraded lines in 2004, compared to 257 CRH trains op-
erating on the high-speed rails in 2007. Both facts illustrate that the intensity of
the upgrade in 2004 is less than that in 2007. The GDP reduction is likely to be
driven by a reduction of investment, as suggested in Column 5-6 of Table B.2.
The decrease of fixed asset investment in the high-speed rail affected counties
in 2007 is around 10-11 percent, which is doubled compared to the reduction of
GDP.
2.4.3 Event study
The OLS estimation suggests that the high-speed rail upgrade in 2007 signifi-
cantly hurts the economic growth in the affected counties. However, a prereq-
uisite for the validity of difference-in-difference design is that the pre-trend of
outcome variables between control and treatment groups should be similar. In
12The impact of high-speed rail upgrade on GDP per capita may work through its impact on
population changes. However, as suggested in Table B.13, population is basically not affected
in the treated counties of high-speed rail upgrade. There seems to be a one percent increase in
overall population after high-speed rail upgrade in 2007 in one of the two specifications. But
none of the other population measures (rural population, total number of households, and total
number of rural households) is significantly affected by high-speed rail upgrade.
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this subsection, I present event study graphs that plot the effects of high-speed
rail upgrade in 2007 on the economic performance of affected counties. These
graphs are derived from the following regression model:
Outcomei,t =β0 +
2∑
k=−5
αkHSRi ∗ 1{Yrt = k}
+ γYeart ∗ Provincei + δCountyi + i,t (2.3)
where 1{Yrt = k} is an event time indicator equal to 1 for each year before
and after the high-speed rail upgrade. Year zero is the year that the high-speed
rail upgrade was implemented. For example, in year 2007, Yrt = 0; while in
year 2006, Yrt = −1. In order to compare the effects of the event over years
with the year right before the high-speed rail upgrade, year 2006 is taken as
the baseline year. Therefore its coefficient (k = −1) is not reported in this event
study. It is worth mentioning that counties that were affected by the high-speed
rail upgrade in 2004 have been excluded from this analysis since the event study
focuses on the upgrade in 2007.
Figure A.9 plots the event study coefficients, αk, and 95% confidence inter-
vals within a seven-year event window. The point estimates represent the time
path of outcome variables, i.e., GDP, GDP per capita, and fixed asset investment
affected by high-speed rail upgrade relative to non-affected counties conditional
on county and province*year fixed effects. All three graphs support the valid-
ity of the design since none of the coefficients are significantly different from
zero prior to the high-speed rail upgrade in year zero, which indicates little dif-
ference in prior growth trend between the treatment and control groups. The
graphs also suggest that there seems to be a drop in GDP, GDP per capita, and
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fixed asset investment right after the high-speed rail upgrade, which is consis-
tent with the previous estimation. Additionally, the negative effect is estimated
to be larger as time goes by.
2.4.4 Instrumental variable estimation
In addition to the standard difference-in-difference estimation, I use an instru-
mental variable estimation strategy to account for the possible non-random
placement of high-speed rail upgrade. More specifically, I use whether a county
is located on the main railway lines to identify whether it is affected by the speed
acceleration or not. Table B.3 presents the reduced form estimation follow-
ing Equation (2.2), by regressing the economic indicators on the “main railway
lines” dummy and its interaction with year dummies, controlling for county
fixed effect and the growth trend in each province and year. It can be seen from
the significance of the coefficients that the instruments, namely being located on
the main railway lines over years, are good explanatory variables of GDP and
GDP per capita variations at the county level. Moreover, being located on the
main railway lines is a greater disadvantage for county economic growth during
the high-speed rail upgrade. For example, the coefficients on Mainline ∗ Year07
are negative in all of the six regressions in Table B.3, with three of them signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level. The coefficients for Mainline∗Year08 and Mainline∗Year09
are all negative and generally larger than the coefficient for Mainline ∗ Year07,
which describes the trend of increasing discrepancy of GDP growth between
counties located on main railway lines and other lines.
Table B.4 reports the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation for the im-
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pact of high-speed rail on the three outcome variables. The First stage F
statistic is 12.16 for the endogenous variable “HSR07 ∗ A f ter” and 71.91 for
“HSR04 ∗ A f ter,” which shows the strong correlation between instruments
and endogenous program placement. The magnitude and significance for the
2SLS estimation is similar to the OLS estimation, except for the coefficient of
“HSR04 ∗ A f ter” on the impact of GDP growth (Column 2, Row 1 of Table B.4).
The same coefficient is negative without significance in the OLS regression in
Table B.2. However, the coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.05 level in
the 2SLS estimation, which is consistent with the significant negative coefficient
on Mainline ∗ Year04 in the reduced form estimation (Column 2, Row 3 of Table
B.3.) In addition, the predicted average GDP growth rate for the non-affected
counties and affected counties are 24.6% and 18.5% from year 2006 to 2007 ac-
cording to the 2SLS estimation.13 Therefore, the estimated impact of high-speed
rail upgrade on GDP growth, which is 3.9% after translating the coefficient on
log GDP into growth rate, explains around 64% of the GDP growth rate differ-
ences between the two groups.
To summarize, the findings in Table B.2-B.4 suggest that high-speed rail up-
grade negatively impacts the economic growth of the counties located on the
affected railway lines. More specifically, the GDP and GDP per capita of such
counties decrease by 4-6 percent, which is around 336-503 million yuan annu-
ally, given the average county level GDP as 8.39 billion yuan in 2006 in the af-
fected regions. Such negative impact explains around 64% of the GDP growth
differentials between the affected and non-affected counties in the year of the
high-speed rail upgrade. Furthermore, the reduction of fixed asset investment
13Specifically, the average predicted values of log GDP for non-affected counties are 3.65 and
3.87 in 2006 and 2007, so the growth rate is e0.22−1 which equals to 24.6%. Similarly, the average
predicted log GDP for affected counties in these two years is 4.11 and 4.28, so the growth rate is
e0.17 − 1 which equals to 18.5%. The predicted values are derived from the 2SLS estimation.
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is doubled in terms of GDP reduction, which is around 10-11 percent in terms of
magnitude. This can be translated as a reduction of 365-402 million yuan annu-
ally, given the average county-level fixed asset investment as 3.65 billion yuan
in 2006 in the affected regions. Therefore, it can be concluded that the GDP re-
duction is mainly investment driven and can be explained by the drop in fixed
asset investment to a large extent.
2.4.5 Robustness check using collapsed data
As mentioned in Bertrand et al. (2004), the standard error of the “treatment vari-
able” in difference-in-difference analysis may be underestimated due to the se-
rial correlation among the observations of the same object over years. Bertrand
et al. (2004) suggest collapsing the data into “pre” and “post” periods to min-
imize the number of periods for each object, which helps to mitigate the serial
correlation problem in difference-in-difference analysis. Following this method,
I collapse the data from 2005-2009 into “pre” period (year 2005 and 2006) and
“post” period (year 2007, 2008, and 2009). Similarly, I collapse the data from
2002-2009 into three periods: “pre” period I (year 2002 and 2003), “pre” period
II (year 2004, 2005, and 2006), and “post” period (year 2007, 2008, and 2009).
The OLS and 2SLS estimation for the collapsed data is reported in Table B.5
and B.6. The results for OLS regressions are consistent with the estimation using
disaggregated data. Similarly, the results for 2SLS estimation are consistent with
the previous estimation, with the exception of one coefficient for the impact
of high-speed rail in 2004. The impact of high-speed rail on GDP per capita
becomes significantly positive with the collapsed data, which is contradictory
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to the estimation in Table B.4. One reason for this may be that the collapsed
data affects the predictive power of the first stage estimation as the number
of instruments decreases after collapse, which subsequently affects the second
stage. It can be concluded in general that the negative impact of the high-speed
rail upgrade in 2007 is more robust and consistent than the impact of the high-
speed rail upgrade in 2004.
2.4.6 The impact of high-speed rail placement on cities at the
prefecture level
It is shown in the previous section that less connectivity to the outside due to
high-speed rail upgrade is detrimental to the small counties located on the af-
fected railway lines. Another relevant question to ask is: have large cities ben-
efited from better connectivity due to high-speed rail placement? It is hard to
identify clearly the impact of high-speed rail on cities since they are connected to
the high-speed rail “on purpose” instead of “quasi-randomly” assigned. There-
fore, the identification strategy used for counties cannot be applied to the anal-
ysis of prefecture-level cities. However, in order to provide some suggestive
evidence, an OLS analysis with exactly the same setting as Equation (2.1) has
been conducted using all the prefecture-level cities with railroad access no later
than 1996.14
Table B.7 (Panel A and B) shows the “correlation” of high-speed rail up-
grade on prefecture-level cities in terms of both level and growth. Interestingly,
high-speed rail placement does not correlate with high economic growth in the
14All of the GDP, GDP per capita, and fixed asset investment measures include only urban
areas (districts) affiliated with the prefecture level city.
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affected cities, as none of the coefficients on the double difference term are sig-
nificant, though 7 out of 9 coefficients have positive signs. However, the level
regressions show that GDP and fixed asset investment levels significantly in-
crease in cities with high-speed rail upgrade, while the level change of GDP per
capita does not seem to correlate with high-speed rail.
In general, the correlation analysis in cities provides some suggestive evi-
dence that high-speed rail upgrade has only a mild impact on economic growth
in the prefecture-level cities. The result, though interesting, is not very surpris-
ing for two main reasons. First, a city economy has a much larger base than
a county economy. Therefore, a positive shock in transportation technology
may have only a trivial impact on economic growth rate, though its impact on
economic levels may not be trivial. Second, cities generally have multiple, well-
developed modes of transportation networks, including not only railroad, but
also highway, air, and, in the coastal areas, water. Thus, the marginal productiv-
ity increase from a technological improvement of the railway system may not
play an important role. However, the marginal productivity decrease due to
lost connectivity to railroad transportation is likely to be more detrimental in
counties as they generally have a less developed transportation network.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Heterogeneous impacts in different sectors
The main findings discussed in the above section suggest that the counties lo-
cated in the high-speed rail upgrade railway lines have suffered from economic
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slowdown in terms of GDP, GDP per capita, and fixed asset investment com-
pared to counties located on the non-affected railway lines. In addition, such
negative impact is especially strong for the high-speed rail upgrade in 2007
compared to the early round of upgrade in 2004 due to its wider coverage with
higher-lifted speed.
Since high-speed rail upgrade only affects the passenger rail services, while
leaving the freight services almost unchanged, it may generate a larger negative
impact on service industries (more sensitive to transportation cost of passen-
gers) than on manufacturing industries (more sensitive to transportation cost
of goods). To test this hypothesis, I estimate the impacts of high-speed rail up-
grade on industrial and service sector value added in log forms following the
same specifications as shown in Table B.2 and B.4.
Table B.8 reports the heterogeneous impacts of the railway upgrade on in-
dustrial sector and service sector using both OLS and IV estimation. It is sug-
gested that the growth rate of service sector value added was reduced by 3-4
percent after the upgrade in 2007 in the affected counties. However, it seems
that high-speed rail upgrade does not significantly affect the growth rate of in-
dustrial sector value added. These estimation results validate the hypothesis
that the upgrade on passenger rail services affects service industries more than
manufacturing industries.15
15It will be more interesting to further investigate the impacts of high-speed rail upgrade on
different industries within the service sector. However, industry level GDP is not available in
the statistical yearbooks. I then use the total employment in different industries in each county
reported in the 2000 and 2010 China Population Census to test the impact of high-speed rail up-
grade on employment changes in four industries within the service sector: hotel and restaurant;
financial services; real estate and rental services. The OLS estimation results are reported in
Table B.14. I do not find significant negative impacts of high-speed rail on employment changes
in these four industries from year 2000 to 2010, even though three out of the four coefficients are
negative. The estimation would be more precise if yearly industry level data is available.
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2.5.2 Impacts by distance to the nearest high-speed train station
Counties are not equally distant to high-speed train stations in the urban ar-
eas. Some are close to the urban districts, while others are a few hundred
kilometers away. It is thus interesting to examine whether the negative impact
of high-speed rail upgrade varies by the geographical proximity to high-speed
train stations. On the one hand, it is possible that the counties close to the ur-
ban core were negatively affected the most since more investment was diverted
from such counties to the well-connected urban areas due to proximity. On the
other hand, it is also be possible that the counties distant from the urban areas
were hurt the most since positive agglomeration spillovers from the cities to the
nearby counties may offset some of the negative impact in these counties close
to high-speed train stations.
In order to test the possible heterogeneous impacts by distance to high-speed
train stations, I compute the distance (unit:100 km) from the centroid of each
county to the centroid of its nearest city with high-speed train stations, and
interact the distance and squared distance with the difference-in-difference co-
efficient to estimate the possible heterogeneous impacts. Table B.9 shows the
results. “HSR07 ∗ A f ter ∗ Distance” and “HSR07 ∗ A f ter ∗ DistanceS quared” are
the two triple difference terms. In addition to these terms, I also control for each
pairwise interaction and the main effects. The results suggest that the impact of
high-speed rail upgrade does not vary by the proximity to high-speed train sta-
tions in the urban areas. None of the triple difference terms are significant at the
0.1 level. The coefficient on “HSR07 ∗ A f ter ∗ Distance” is marginally negatively
significant for fixed asset investment, indicating some weak evidence that the
negative impact of high-speed rail on investment increased by distance.
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2.5.3 Channels
There are two possible channels which may lead to economic slowdown in the
high-speed rail affected counties. First, since high-speed trains squeeze out
some of the conventional train services in the affected counties, the train ac-
cessibility decreases in those counties, which implies a transportation cost (or
trade cost) increase in such places. As a consequence, the affected counties will
become less integrated and economic activities will decline in response to the
increase in trade barriers. Second, high-speed rail upgrade connects large cities
more tightly by reduced commuting time, which intensifies the agglomeration
forces between large cities. In that case, it is likely that the economic activities
will divert from small counties to large cities in order to enjoy the agglomer-
ation spillovers generated from a more tightly connected transportation net-
work. This possible channel resonates with the findings in Faber (2013) that the
national trunk highway system in China leads to reduced industrial output in
connected counties, given no reduction in transportation cost in those counties.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, a county being “affected” by high-speed rail,
i.e., located on the high-speed rail upgrade lines, does not necessarily have a
train service reduction after the rail upgrade since a county’s overall train ser-
vices are also determined by the services provided by other railway lines that
pass through the county. Therefore, in order to test the validity of the first chan-
nel, I further examine the heterogeneous impact of high-speed rail upgrade in
the affected counties that suffered from train service reduction in the year 2007
(group A) and the other affected counties that did not experience train service
reduction during the same period (group B). If the increased trade cost due to
train service reduction is a channel for the reduced economic activities in the
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affected counties, the impact of high-speed rail in group A should be more neg-
ative than that in group B since group A suffered from a larger increase in trade
cost.
Table B.10 presents the comparison of high-speed rail’s impact between the
above-mentioned two groups. The variable “train service not reduced” equals to
one if the observations belong to group B, otherwise zero. While the interaction
term between the double difference coefficient (HSR ∗ A f ter) and the trade cost
dummy variable (train service not reduced) indicates the difference of high-speed
rail’s impact between the two groups. It is shown that two out of the three in-
teraction terms are positive, which works in favor of our hypothesis that the im-
pact of high-speed rail upgrade on group B is less negative than that on group A.
However, the difference in terms of impact is not statistically significant which
provides weak support to the first channel.
In order to test the second channel, i.e., whether the improved agglomer-
ation benefits between large cities after high-speed rail upgrade diverted eco-
nomic activities from small counties to large cities, I collected the highway sta-
tus of all the counties in the sample before and after the high-speed rail up-
grade in 2007. The hypothesis is that, if a county has already been connected to
the highway network prior to high-speed rail upgrade in 2007, some of its eco-
nomic activities have already been diverted to the large cities on the highway
network (Faber 2013). Therefore, if the second channel works, the high-speed
rail upgrade’s negative impact on diverting economic activities away should be
smaller comparing to its impact in counties that had no highway network prior
to high-speed rail upgrade.
Table B.11 displays the comparison of high-speed rail’s impact between
33
counties with and without highway access prior to high-speed rail upgrade
in 2007. The dummy variable “connected to highway be f ore 2007” equals to
one if the county was connected to the highway network before year 2007,
zero otherwise. Similar to the test of the first channel, an interaction term
between double difference coefficient and highway status (HSR07 ∗ A f ter ∗
Connected to Highway be f ore 2007) is included in the regression to test the dif-
ferential impact in counties with different highway access. It is shown in Table
B.11 that all the three interaction terms have a positive coefficient, indicating
that counties with highway access prior to 2007 suffered less from high-speed
rail upgrade than counties without highway access. Especially, the differential
impact between the two groups is most significant for GDP in terms of both
magnitude and significance. High-speed rail upgrade reduced GDP by only 3
percent in counties with highway access, while the impact in counties without
highway access was three times larger (9 percent). Therefore, the second chan-
nel is likely to play a role in explaining counties’ reduced economic activities
due to high-speed rail upgrade.
2.5.4 Magnitude of the impact
The main results suggest that high-speed rail upgrade negatively impacts the
GDP growth rate of the counties located on the affected railway lines by 4-5
percent. Answers to the following two questions may help us better understand
the magnitude of such impact. First, how large is the impact compared to the
average economic growth rate in those areas? The annual GDP grew from 4.38
billion yuan in 2002 to 13.65 billion yuan in 2009 in the affected counties, with an
overall growth rate of 311.6%, translating into an annual growth rate of 17.6%.
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This implies that the magnitude of 4-5 percent GDP reduction is economic sig-
nificant for the economic growth of the counties affected by the upgrade.
Given that high-speed rail upgrade leads to significant economic slowdown
in the affected counties, the next question to ask is whether the GDP reduction
in counties outweighs the economic gains in cities, which makes high-speed
rail upgrade an unattractive investment in terms of its economic returns. Given
that the average GDP for the 183 affected counties is 8.39 billion yuan in 2006,
the total loss of GDP in the 183 counties is 76.77 billion yuan in 2007.16 A total
of 80 cities have been connected with high-speed rail in 2007, thus the net eco-
nomic return of the investment in its first year would be positive as long as the
average economic benefit in cities exceeds 76.77/80 = 0.96 billion yuan. Since
there is no credible estimate on the causal impact of high-speed rail upgrade on
GDP growth in cities, I use Panel B of Table B.7 as a possible benchmark, where
the estimated benefit of the upgrade is 16.76-21.67 billion yuan of GDP increase
in the affected cities. Based on that, the benefit that high-speed rail upgrade
brought to cities seems to be more than enough to compensate for the losses in
counties.
2.6 Conclusion
Infrastructure is supposed to promote economic growth. However, infrastruc-
ture investment with a preference in the urban sector may generate negative
externalities to the less developed rural sector in developing countries. The
quasi-experiment of high-speed rail upgrade in China in the year 2004 and 2007
16I use 5% here as the maximum negative impact of high-speed rail upgrade.
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provides an ideal case to study the distributional consequences of infrastructure
investment.
Applying conventional difference-in-difference (OLS) and instrumental
variable strategies, I come out with the following main conclusions. First, by
comparing GDP and GDP per capita of counties located on the affected railway
lines to counties located on other railway lines, evidence suggests that there is
a 4-6 percent significant reduction in GDP and GDP per capita after the 2007
high-speed rail upgrade in the counties located on the affected railway lines.
After accounting for nonrandom high-speed rail placement, the 2SLS estima-
tion shows consistent estimation in terms of significance and magnitude. Such
impact could explain around 64% of the predicted GDP growth differentials
between the affected and non-affected counties right after high-speed rail up-
grade. Second, the GDP reduction in the high-speed rail bypassed counties,
which is around 336-503 million yuan, given the average county level GDP as
8.39 billion yuan in 2006, can be largely explained by the concurrent drop in fixed
asset investment. Third, since high-speed rail upgrade affects the transporta-
tion of passengers and not transportation of goods, its negative impact is more
pronounced in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. Lastly, the
diverted economic activities from small counties to large cities due to increased
agglomeration forces is likely to be a channel accounting for the negative impact
of high-speed rail. Together, these results imply that the distributional implica-
tions of these types of investments can be dramatic.
In addition to the negative consequences brought to counties, it seems that
the introduction of high-speed rail upgrade in prefecture-level cities is only as-
sociated with mild positive impact in terms of GDP and investment. However,
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it is likely that some of the benefits could not be captured given the limited
availability of data, such as its potential positive impact on subjective welfare
of urban residents. More importantly, it may generate some long-run impact in
reshaping the economic geography of the country, which may not be captured
for now. Furthermore, future research is needed to establish a cleaner causal re-
lationship between high-speed rail and economic growth at the prefecture-city
level.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROAD TO SPECIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION:
EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA
3.1 Introduction
In developing countries, many rural poor live in isolated areas. Because they
reside far from markets, the poor are more likely to rely on self-sufficient, sub-
sistence farming to survive. Spatial poverty traps are a silent feature of the rural
landscape (Jalan and Ravallion 2002). Scholars have argued that rural roads are
a key instrument in overcoming spatial poverty traps in developing countries
(Caldern 2009; Escobal and Ponce 2002; Fan and Hazell 2001; Jacoby and Minten
2008). However, rural roads may be costly to build, and therefore rigorous im-
pact assessments of the effects of rural roads in lagging areas are necessary be-
fore policy interventions.
A limited number of studies have evaluated the returns to investing in roads
in developing countries, but many of them are conducted at the aggregate level
(Fan and Hazell 2001; Fan and Zhang 2004; Zhang and Fan, 2004). Those studies
have been criticized for failing to uncover the mechanisms by which road con-
nections shape household production and consumption behavior (Jacoby 2000).
Studies at the household level, on the other hand, often rely on cross-sectional
data due to difficulties in obtaining long-term time series data in poor areas.
However, cross-sectional data cannot address the problem of endogenous road
placement, that is, roads are more likely to be built in high-potential areas. To
overcome the problem of endogeneity, Jacoby (2000) develops an innovative
approach to evaluate the impact of road access on agricultural land value, com-
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puted based on the discounted stream of maximal profits from cultivation. Yet
the approach is inadequate for evaluating impact on the welfare of landless la-
borers, who are common in developing countries. In the context of China, the
method is also inapplicable because farmers do not own the land but only hold
the right to cultivate it. In the absence of agricultural land markets, uncovering
true farmland value proves difficult.
In this chapter, we use a primary panel household dataset collected in a re-
mote and poor area of China to investigate the impact of road connections on
rural welfare by focusing on agricultural specialization and input use. Road
connections can potentially reshape the production choice set of isolated farm-
ers and affect agricultural production, the major livelihood of the poor, in at
least two ways.
First, with lower transportation costs, farmers may shift their agricultural
production from autarkic, subsistence farming to more market-oriented, spe-
cialized activities (Limao and Venables 2001; Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja
2004). Yang and Ng (1993) develop a theoretical model showing that producers
will choose to specialize in one activity according to their comparative advan-
tage and simply purchase other goods and services from the market, provided
that transaction costs are sufficiently small. In contrast, when transaction costs
are too high, it makes more economic sense for producers to remain autarkic.
Using a simulation approach, Omamo (1998) finds that as distance to the mar-
ket shortens, small-scale farmers tend to shift away from diversified cropping
patterns in favor of cultivating only one crop. However, the empirical find-
ings are mixed. For example, Stifel, Minten, and Dorosh (2003) show that in
Madagascar, the concentration level of agricultural production in the least re-
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mote areas is around 1.5 times that of the most remote areas, suggesting that
improved road access facilitates specialization in agricultural production. Gib-
son and Rozelle (2003) provide a counterexample: they find that in Papua New
Guinea, each extra hour it takes to reach the nearest road induces a 2.6 percent
reduction in the number of activities, in contrast to the theoretical prediction.
However, the variable “number of activities” does not necessarily reflect the in-
tensity of each activity, such as the time spent, income earned, or area cropped.
Therefore, the result in Gibson and Rozelle (2003) may not be in direct conflict
with the estimation by Stifel, Minten, and Dorosh (2003) from the dimension of
specialization.
Second, as improved road access reduces transportation costs, the prices of
modern inputs such as fertilizer are more likely to drop (Khandker, Bakht, and
Koolwal 2006). Consequently, farmers may apply more modern inputs to im-
prove agricultural productivity. In addition, farmers may hire more labor to
take care of specialized agricultural production as road access improves. Gollin
and Rogerson (2010) develop a theoretical model and calibrate it with Ugandan
data, showing that as transportation cost declines, farmers will use more inter-
mediate inputs, which in turn contribute to agricultural output growth. The
empirical findings on the impact of rural roads on modern input use, however,
are inconclusive. Benziger (1996) finds that better road access leads to increasing
fertilizer use in villages in Hebei, China. Stifel, Minten, and Dorosh (2003) show
that farmers in more isolated regions of Madagascar use less fertilizer than those
in places with better road access. However, Dorosh et al. (2010) paint a more
complicated story: input use depends on not only distance to roads but also
the density of road networks. In East Africa, for example, reducing travel time
significantly increases adoption of high-input/high-yield technology, whereas
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roads have an insignificant impact in West Africa, where road network density
is relatively higher at the beginning of the sampling period.
One challenge to an empirical evaluation of the impact of road access on
agricultural production is data limitation. Most empirical studies rely on cross-
sectional data, making it hard to control for unobserved factors, such as the
placement effect mentioned earlier. In this chapter, we use a primary house-
hold panel dataset collected in 17 natural villages over four waves in Guizhou
Province, China, to investigate how road access shapes farmers’ cropping deci-
sions and their livelihoods.
Our dataset possesses two advantages when studying the impact of access to
road networks in isolated villages. First, given that it relies on non-recall panel
data, our study provides relatively accurate and credible information with re-
spect to household agricultural production. Second, the four waves of data al-
low us to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis, which helps mitigate es-
timation biases as a result of omitting variables and reverse causality commonly
seen in regressions based on cross-sectional datasets. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper to empirically document the impact of road access
on agricultural specialization and input use in China.
We find that access to roads fosters household agricultural specialization.
The impact is economically significant and is about one-fifth of the standard de-
viation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman specialization index (HHI). In addition,
better road connectivity induces farmers to apply more fertilizer and spend
more money hiring labor. Thanks to those two channels, road access is shown
to boost farmers’ agricultural income, which in turn contributes to poverty re-
duction. However, the introduction of road access does not seem to improve
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farmers’ nonagricultural income in this remote area.
The findings may have some policy implications for China. In the past
several decades, the Chinese government has made significant investments in
building a nationwide highway system. As the highway density increases, the
marginal returns to highway investment are likely to decrease. Fan and Chan-
Kang (2005) argue that it may make more economic sense to gear investment
toward rural roads. But rural roads carry less traffic, are harder to maintain,
and are more costly to build in remote areas. Therefore, it is important to gather
more empirical evidence as to how rural roads affect agricultural patterns and
rural livelihoods in lagging regions.
One should be cautious in explaining the findings. Our sample focuses
only on the mountainous rural areas in southwestern China, where smallholder
farming is the dominant mode of agricultural production. As China is a large
and spatially diverse country, the findings drawn from this sample may not ap-
ply to China as a whole. Our study is more relevant for understanding as to
how road connections might affect farming practices and rural livelihoods in
isolated and impoverished regions.
3.2 Description of Data
As Figure A.10 shows, Guizhou is located in southwestern China. Guizhou is
one of China’s poorest provinces and has the shortest road length due in part to
its mountainous terrain.1 Figure A.11 depicts the road system in Guizhou as of
1According to China Statistical Yearbook (2005), GDP per capita in Guizhou is 4,317 yuan in
2004, lowest among all the mainland provinces in China. Highway and level I road length in
Guizhou is also the lowest among all the mainland provinces as of year 2004.
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2004. Highway networks are sparse in Guizhou, with only four reaching from
the provincial capital (Guiyang Shi) to major cities in the province. Although
national and provincial roads are numerous, the density is much lower than
the national average. In remote mountainous villages, some households still
practice subsistence farming, whereas households in relatively flat areas sell
most of their agricultural products to the market. The large variation in road
access in our sample thus provides us with a valuable opportunity to study the
impact of road access on agricultural production in isolated regions.
The survey site, Puding County, comprises 11 townships and 317 admin-
istrative villages, and as of the end of 2008 had a total population of 448,000
people.2 A highway and a national road bypass the county border, and one
provincial road cuts through the county. In 2008 the average household income
in Puding County was around 5,800 yuan, slightly above the provincial median
but below the provincial mean. 3 As Figure A.12 depicts, in terms of per capita
rural income, Puding is in the middle tercile, suggesting Puding is a rather rep-
resentative county in Guizhou Province.
Three administrative villages representing different levels of economic de-
velopment of Puding were chosen for the survey. The three administrative vil-
lages (henceforth referred to as Administrative Village I, II, and III) contain 17
natural villages. A census-type survey of households in all the natural villages
was first administered in early 2005 and included 805 households. A second sur-
2An administrative village is a bureaucratic entity comprising several natural villages (ham-
lets). A typical natural village includes 30 to 50 households. It is too small to form an admin-
istrative unit. As a result, some nearby natural villages are artificially put together to create an
administrative village. However, in the mountainous area, it sometimes takes one a few hours
to walk from one natural village to another within the same administrative village.
3In our sample, the average household income in 2006 is 7,619 yuan, which is above the mean
household income according to official statistics. It is likely that our sampled township is close
to the county seat which is richer than the county as a whole.
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vey wave, covering 833 households, was conducted in early 2007. A third wave
was undertaken in early 2010 and surveyed 873 households. And the fourth
wave was carried out in early 2012 covering 943 households. 4 The surveys
collected detailed information on household characteristics, demographics, in-
come, agricultural production, and consumption.
The natural villages vary widely in their degree of road access. We define
a road as being accessible if tractors can drive through during the rainy sea-
son. 5 Using information collected from the records of village offices, Table
B.15 summarizes road access in the 17 natural villages in 2004, 2006, 2009, and
2011. Administrative Village III, which is right next to the county seat, has the
best road access of the three administrative villages. All of Administrative Vil-
lage III’s natural villages already had road access prior to the first wave of the
survey. Four natural villages in Administrative Village I constructed roads dur-
ing our survey periods. However, until our most recent survey, some natural
villages, such as Natural Village 1 and Natural Village 3, had yet to gain road
access. In Administrative Village II, one natural village built a new road during
2004 and 2006, whereas two other natural villages still lacked road access at the
time of our most recent survey.
As we are interested in the impact of road access on agricultural specializa-
tion, we constructed a Herfindahl-Hirschman index as a measure of specializa-
tion at the household level. The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of
agricultural income shares derived from different production activities.6 The
4The total number of surveyed households varies across different years due to cases of fam-
ilies split, migration, and a few attritions. There are 782, 815, 834, and 935 valid observation
households in the four waves, respectively.
5Market activities also exist during rainy season. Therefore it is necessary to emphasis the
constraint of “rainy season” in the definition of road.
6For example, if the household produces maize and fruit, with an income (including in-
kind) of 2,000 yuan and 3,000 yuan, then the specialization index is calculated as (2000/5000)2 +
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specialization index ranges between 0 and 1. The greater the value, the higher
the degree of specialization.
Table B.16 reports income sources from several major agricultural activities.
For each agricultural activity, total income is the sum of cash income and in-kind
income (imputed using market price of the specific year). Maize is the predom-
inant crop, generating the largest share of agricultural income, ranging from
37 to 46 percent in the four survey years. As the second most important crop,
rapeseed provides 16 to 21 percent of household agricultural income. Livestock
ranks third in terms of agricultural income generation. In our sample, approx-
imately 18 to 30 percent of households were engaged in livestock production
compared to approximately 90 percent participation rates in maize and rape-
seed production.
It is worth noting that the categories of agricultural income decomposition
are slightly different across the three waves of surveys due to changes in ques-
tionnaire design. For example, the 2004 and 2009 waves contain nine subcat-
egories of agricultural income, whereas the 2006 and 2011 waves have 10 sub-
categories. Additionally, no data are available for vegetable income in 2009. To
address these problems, we construct two alternative specialization measures
as robustness checks based on different classifications of income categories. For
the first alternative measure, we impute the vegetable income in 2009 based on
the actual vegetable seed cost available in 2009 and then estimate the past re-
lationship between vegetable seed cost and income observed in the first two
survey waves (variable denoted as HHI [2]). In so doing, we obtain comparable
household vegetable income for all the four waves. For the second alternative
measure, we reclassify the non-overlapping subcategories and the rest of the in-
(3000/5000)2 = 0.52.
45
come as “other.” After the adjustment, there are nine comparable subcategories
of agricultural income across the four waves (variable denoted as HHI [3]).
Table B.17 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in the
analysis.7 Average household income more than doubled from 6,246 yuan in
2004 to 16,538 yuan in 2011. Income generated from nonagricultural activities
played a key role in overall income growth. Nonfarm income grew from 2,267
yuan in 2004 to 10,840 yuan in 2011. By comparison, average household agri-
cultural income grew at a slower pace, from 3,978 yuan to 5,698 yuan, during
the seven-year period. The relatively lackluster performance in the agricultural
sector is not surprising given limited arable land in this area. After all, Guizhou
ranks among the lowest in per capita arable land in the Chinese provinces. On
average each person in our survey village cultivated only 0.81 mu of land in
2011, about half of the national average of 1.4 mu per capita.8
Lastly, the mean level of household agricultural specialization index is 0.46,
0.41, 0.49, and 0.47 in 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011, respectively. The drop in the
specialization index in 2006 is perhaps due to that year’s severe drought. In
2006, the share of corn income dropped to 39 percent, lower than that of 2004
(46 percent) and 2009 (42 percent). The drought may thus result in the blip in
the trend of the HHI.
The summary statistics reveal stark differences between households with
and without road access. As Table B.18 shows, the mean household income in
villages with road access is almost double that of villages without road access.
Both the agricultural and nonagricultural incomes per capita in households with
road access are higher than the incomes of their counterparts. In terms of agri-
7All the income and price measures have been deflated to year 2004.
81 mu = 0.066667 hectare.
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cultural production, the villages with roads were more specialized than those
without access to roads. In general, households with road access tend to be of
a smaller size, have larger areas of cultivated land, and have higher levels of
education.
3.3 Empirical Model
Our empirical question is the following: does road access have any impact on
the extent of specialization and input use in agricultural production? In this
paper, we adopt a difference-in-difference method to answer that question. The
specification is as follows:
Yi,t = α0 + β1Roadi ∗ Be f orea f teri,t + Zi,t + φvillage + ψyear + i,t (3.1)
where Yi,t is a dependent variable for household i in time t; Roadi denotes
whether the village to which household i belongs has a road by the end of our
last survey wave (year 2011); Be f orea f teri,t denotes whether the village house-
hold i belongs to has road access in year t; Zi,t represents a series of control vari-
ables, including cultivated land area, number of primary-age laborers (being
from 16 to 60 years old) in a family, household size, the highest year of school-
ing within the household, and whether there is a village leader in the household;
φvillage stands for natural village fixed effects; ψyear controls for year fixed effects;
i,t is the error term.
Our coefficient of interest is β1, the double difference term, which represents
the impact of road access on the outcome variables. The main dependent vari-
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ables in our estimation are (i) the household agricultural specialization index
(HHI [1], HHI [2], and HHI [3]); (ii) fertilizer use measured by the natural log of
the monetary value of fertilizer use per mu of land; (iii) expenditures on hired
labor in logarithmic form; and (iv) the natural log of agricultural income, nona-
gricultural income, and total income per capita in the household. If road access
promotes agricultural specialization, we expect β1 to be positive and significant.
Similarly, β1 is expected to be positive and significant as well if the outcome
variable is either fertilizer use, the cost of hired labor, or household income.
Because we have a panel dataset, we can largely remedy the common prob-
lems plaguing cross-sectional analyses. For instance, we can include household
characteristics, natural village fixed effects, and year fixed effects to mitigate
omitted variable bias. Since the cropping and input use decisions depend upon
the existing road conditions, instead of specialization and input use on road
placement, reverse causality is unlikely. It is also hard to imagine farmers would
change their cropping patterns in anticipation of a new road in the next several
years. Perhaps the biggest challenge is road placement. As suggested by recent
impact evaluation literature (Duflo and Pande 2007), the nonrandom program
placement may bring about endogeneity problems in economic estimations. A
typical solution is to carry out a two-stage least-squares analysis by instrument-
ing the policy with a set of exogenous variables. However, the road variable
varies only at the natural village level and there are only 17 natural villages in
the dataset, making it impossible to implement the first-stage regression with
such a small number of observations. Since our objective is to examine how
households respond to road connections in their production decisions, the po-
tential endogeneity problem of road placement, if any, is minimal.
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Since the road status change is at the natural village level, we need to
cluster the standard errors by 17 natural villages. However, when a sam-
ple comprises of a small number of clusters (fewer than 30), the conventional
double-difference estimation on the standard errors may become less precise
(Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). More specifically, the clustered standard
error tends to over reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we adopt the wild
cluster bootstrap-t procedure, which Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) have
demonstrated as having good size properties with small number of clusters, and
report the bootstrapped p-values for the key variable of interest in the regres-
sion tables. 9
3.4 Empirical Results
Table B.19 reports the main regression results on specialization, fertilizer use,
and cost of hired labor. Natural village fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included in all the regressions to control for village-specific factors, such as vil-
lage growth potential and common temporal trends such as investment policy.
The first column under each heading lists the most parsimonious specification,
and household characteristics are added in the second column.
For specialization, we use three indexes: HHI [1], HHI [2], and HHI [3]. Re-
gardless of the two different specifications, road access is shown to have posi-
9Appendix B of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) introduces the details of the wild
bootstrap-t procedure. Basically the bootstrap procedure resamples residual using Rademacher
weights (equal probabilities of 1 and -1) to obtain a new sampling of residuals from a restricted
regression with a null hypothesis (β1 = 0 in our model). The Wald statistic of the OLS estimation
with clustered standard error is calculated for each pseudo-sample. The bootstrapped p-value
is inferred from the location of the original Wald statistic in the distribution of bootstrapped
Wald statistics in 999 replications.
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tive and significant impact on agricultural specialization. The results are robust
to three slightly different specialization indexes. On average, road access im-
proved the specialization index by 3 percentage points, which is approximately
one-fifth of one standard deviation of the HHI.
As Table B.19 shows, better road connections also induce farmers to apply
more fertilizer. After improvements in road connections, fertilizer use (yuan per
mu) rose by 33.6 percent (after translating the log form coefficient 0.29 into a real
growth rate). Similarly, road access boosted household expenditure on hired
labor (yuan per mu) by 75.1 percent (after translating the log form coefficient
0.56 into a real growth rate).
As farmers specialize in their agricultural production, apply greater
amounts of modern inputs, and hire more skilled professional workers, we ex-
pect their agricultural income to increase as well. Table B.20 summarizes the
regressions on household income, including agricultural income, nonagricul-
tural income, and total income per capita. There is some evidence that road ac-
cess enhances agricultural income by 27.1 percent (after translating the log form
coefficient 0.24 into a real growth rate), which is marginally significant with a
bootstrapped p-value of 0.15. However, roads do not appear to play a major role
in shaping nonagricultural household income. In this area, most young people
migrate outside of the province to work in the nonfarm sector. Road conditions
are not a binding factor to their migration decision. Overall, the impact of roads
on total income is positive but not significant.
The identification assumption for difference-in-differences requires parallel
growth trend between the control and treatment villages prior to road place-
ment. However, we cannot directly test this assumption since 1) our data con-
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tains only four data points for each observation, and 2) roads were placed in
various years instead of at the same time. In order to shed some lights on the
robustness of the main results without the most direct evidence on common
trend, we conduct a placebo test by moving the road placement to one survey
period earlier. For example, if the village was not given access to road until the
second wave of survey, we take this village as being treated with road place-
ment since the first wave, instead of the second wave, in our placebo treatment.
Table B.21 shows the results for placebo test. The sample is restricted to ob-
servations without access to rural roads, otherwise the estimation results will
be contaminated by the improved outcomes in the affected households after the
introduction of roads. The impacts of a placebo treatment of rural road, which is
one period before the real treatment, on five outcome variables are reported in
this table, including three different measures of specialization indices and two
measures of input use. They are the outcomes which have proved to be signifi-
cantly affected by road status in the main estimation results. However, neither
coefficient is significantly different from zero in the placebo test, which provides
robust evidences on the validity of the difference-in-differences identification.
Considering that most of the poor still depend on agricultural production
as their major livelihood and having shown that better road connections help
farmers improve agricultural income, naturally we expect that road develop-
ment facilities poverty reduction. To test that hypothesis, we regress three com-
mon poverty measures (P0, P1, and P2) at the natural village level on the fol-
lowing variables:10 a dummy variable indicating whether a natural village has
10P0 measures poverty incidence (the proportion of people living under the poverty line). P1
(the so-called poverty gap index) measures the gap between the actual income and the poverty
line. P2 averages the squared poverty gaps relative to the poverty line, which implicitly attaches
greater weight to the poorer segment of the population in the measurement. See Foster, Greer,
and Thorbecke (1984) for details.
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road access in 2011 or not, its interaction term with a dummy variable for the
years with road connection, acreage of land, primary-age population, presence
of a village cadre, and year fixed effects. The poverty measures hinge crucially
on the definition of the poverty line. Under a low poverty line, fewer people
will be counted as poor, while using a high poverty line entails a higher poverty
incidence. To check the robustness of the results to the choice of poverty line,
we calculate two sets of poverty measures based on the official Chinese poverty
line and the international $1-per-day poverty line. The official poverty line is
668 yuan in 2004 prices, equivalent to only $0.66 measured in 1985 purchasing
power parity (see Xing et al. 2009). Using the international poverty line of $1.08
per day per capita, the poverty line in China in 2004 would be 892 yuan.
Table B.22 presents the regression results. Panels A, B, and C show the key
variable of interest, the difference-in-differences interaction term for the three
dependent variables, P0, P1, and P2, respectively. Under each panel are two sets
of regression results, one for the low poverty line and one for the high poverty
line. Under the heading of low poverty line or high poverty line, we further
present two different specifications: no village fixed effects, and with adminis-
trative village fixed effects. Since our panel dataset is at the natural village level,
in principle we should include natural village fixed effects to control for unob-
served natural village specific factors. However, since the poverty measure is
much less variable than the income measure and the number of observations
is rather limited, including natural village fixed effects likely would wipe out
the variations of the dependent variables. Therefore we do not include natural
village fixed effects in the regression tables.11
11The AIC (Akaike information criterion) shows exactly that point. In effect, the most par-
simonious regressions without any fixed effects have the lowest AIC, providing the best fit to
the underlying data generation process. In contrast, the models with the natural village fixed
effects perform the worst.
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Between the two preferable specifications, the parsimonious regressions and
those including only administrative village fixed effects, the coefficient for the
difference-in-differences interaction term is generally significantly negative re-
gardless of the choice of poverty measure, suggesting road development con-
tributes to poverty reduction. The channel of impact is likely through increased
agricultural production and income that the poor primarily rely on.
3.5 Mechanisms
The baseline result in the above section shows that rural road access signifi-
cantly improves the specialization level of agricultural production, as measured
by income-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index. In principle, road access affects
the income-based specialization index through two possible mechanisms: (1)
reallocating cropping areas; and (2) applying more modern inputs (such as fer-
tilizer) thanks to lower transportation cost, which in turn boost yield. Since
farmers in these remote villages are largely price takers, rising yield naturally
results in a greater share of crop income.
In order to probe into the two potential mechanisms, we first calculate the
area-based specialization index at the household level in each survey year.12
Poultry, livestock and fishing activities are not included since they are not area
based. In the next step, we run similar regressions based on Equation (3.1) to
study the impact of road access on area-based specialization index. As shown
in the first two columns of Table B.23, the coefficient on area-based HHIs is
positive and marginally significant, providing some weak evidence that road
12The households in the second wave (year 2007) are excluded since there is no crop specific
area data.
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access promotes the specialization of crop production.
To investigate the second mechanism, we compute the yield of maize and
rice, the two most popular crops in the area, respectively.13 Again, due to the
lack of crop specific area data, we are not able to compute the crop yield for the
households in the 2007 survey. Therefore, only observations in the first wave
and the last two waves have been included in the analysis. Column 3 6 of Table
B.24 shows the results for the impact of road access on the yield of maize and
rice. The yield of maize has been significantly increased by around 45 jin per
mu after road is introduced to the natural village. However, the impact of road
on rice yield is positive but insignificant. The results are consistent with our ob-
servations in the field. Each household can have multiple plots. In general, rice
is mainly produced in relatively plain areas, normally with good road access in
history. So we don’t expect to find new access to road has significant impact on
rice yield. However, maize is mainly produced in hilly areas. So improvement
in road access lowers the transportation cost of fertilizer, inducing farmers to
apply more fertilizer which boosts yield and income.
In a word, as road access improves, farmers are likely to focus on a few num-
bers of crops and apply more modern inputs, resulting in higher yield for the
chosen crops. Consequently, farmers’ agricultural income becomes increasingly
concentrated in a few numbers of crops.
13The unit is defined as jin per mu, where 1 jin = 0.5 kilogram.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, through the use of primary census-type household surveys in
remote villages in China, we examine the impact of road access on agricultural
production, particularly on specialization, and intermediate input use. We find
that better access to roads facilitates farmers to specialize in agricultural pro-
duction, induces them to use more fertilizer, and prompts the hiring of more
laborers. Putting those factors together, road access is shown to promote agri-
cultural income and contribute to poverty reduction. However, its impact on
nonagricultural income is rather minimal. There are two potential reasons for
the insignificant impact on the nonagricultural sector. First, the area is rather
remote. Even with improved road access, local rural nonfarm activities are still
rather limited compared with the coastal regions. Second, the rise in real wages
as a result of the arrival of the Lewis turning point (the exhaustion of surplus la-
bor) since the mid-2000s has attracted a larger number of rural workers to cities
(Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2011). Under such circumstances, farmers increasingly
rely on remittance as the major nonfarm income. In this remote area, farmers’
migration decisions may have little to do with local infrastructure conditions.
In this chapter we find that road access helps facilitate the market integra-
tion of the agricultural economy, therefore enlarging the production scale of
products with comparative advantage. For example, in Natural Village 4 of Ad-
ministrative Village II, the natural endowment is suitable for growing peaches.
Before improvements in road connections, peaches were often damaged after
being carried by shoulder for a long walk to the nearest market. After road con-
struction, farmers can sell their peaches at a collection point right in their natural
village. As a result, peach production has boomed in this area. Given the limited
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data that we have, we try our best in this paper to rule out the other possibilities
which may contaminate the difference-in-differences estimation by applying a
placebo test and using conservative estimation of standard errors. Across all the
settings, the evidences consistently suggest that in areas with road investment,
we tend to observe an increasing trend of agricultural specialization. However,
we admit that we may not fully address the endogeneity concern of road place-
ment given the available datasets.
Also, we shall caution that the findings on road investment’s positive impact
on agricultural production do not necessarily mean that roads should be built
connecting all the remaining natural villages, as the marginal cost of building
roads to the more remote communities may far outweigh the benefit. Thus, a
cost benefit analysis is needed when considering such rural road projects.
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CHAPTER 4
INSECURE HOME OWNERSHIP AND RISING SAVINGS RATES IN
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM REPORTED FORCED EVICTIONS
4.1 Introduction
Savings rates in China have increased a lot in the recent decade. Regardless
of government and corporate savings, the Chinese household savings itself as
a share of disposal income nearly rose from 16 percent in 1990 to 30 percent
in 2007 which caught special attention (Wei and Zhang, 2011). There are two
prevailing explanations with well-founded empirical evidences for the rising
household savings rates in China. First, precautionary savings motive due to
less provision of education, health and housing services, in combination with a
rise in income uncertainty may drive up household savings in China (Blanchard
and Giavazzi 2006; Chamon and Prasad 2010). Second, demographic changes,
such as sex ratio rises in China may lead to higher household savings rates since
Chinese parents with a son raise their savings in a competitive manner in order
to improve their sons relative attractiveness for marriage (Wei and Zhang, 2011).
There are several other explanations as well, such as low level of financial de-
velopment and cultural norms.
In this chapter, I study whether the increasing insecurity of home owner-
ship being reported in the media induces urban households to save more in
China, which is in favor of the precautionary savings motive. This is a less stud-
ied question with increasing importance. On the one hand, home ownership
in China is associated with reduced household savings. Chamon and Prasad
(2010) find that owning a home is associated with sharply lower savings rate
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(4-7 percentage points) among young households. It is thus interesting to in-
vestigate whether owning a home with uncertainty of being demolished will
induce households to save more. On the other hand, insecurity of home owner-
ship is a growing social problem in China in recent years along with the rapid
growth of infrastructure investment and urbanization process. However, there
is no paper studying the potential consequences of such rising social problem
in China as far as is concerned.
I collected the incidence of forced evictions being reported in the largest Chi-
nese news search engine, Baidu News Archive, in each city and year during 2004
to 2011, combined with the average urban household savings rate constructed
from the average disposable income and expenditure data from CEIC database
in prefecture level cities. In addition, I also collected information on other eco-
nomic and demographic indicators at the city level from China Economic and
Social Development Statistical Database.
Using dynamic panel data models, I find that worse insecurity of home own-
ership, as indicated by more frequent forced evictions, leads to higher house-
hold savings rate at the prefecture city level. To be specific, if the incidence
of forced eviction is increased by 161%, which is the average annual growth
rate suggested from the data, household savings rate in that city is expected to
increase by 0.64 to 0.84 percent. I find that there are two possible mechanisms
which may lead to this result. First, it is likely that the impact of forced evictions
on household savings rate works directly through a reduction in home sales. If
forced evictions discourage home sales, it may increase the average household
savings rate in the city due to delayed home purchase. It is also likely that the
impact of forced evictions works through the precautionary savings behavior
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of the home-owners, since they are likely to receive less compensation than the
market value of their properties if being evicted. I find that both channels have
some explanatory power explaining the increase in household savings rate due
to forced evictions.
This chapter is related to two strands of literature. First, it links to the re-
search establishing the link between housing and savings rate (Campbell and
Cocco 2007; Chamon and Prasad 2010; Engelhardt 1996). Using micro data from
U.K., Campbell and Cocco (2007) provide empirical evidence that household
consumption increases as house price booms, especially for older homeowners.
Chamon and Prasad (2010) find that owning a home is associated with sharply
lower savings rate (4-7 percentage points) among young households in China.
Going one step further, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that own-
ing a home with uncertainty of being demolished will induce households to
save more. This is consistent with the empirical findings in Engelhardt (1996)
that households experiencing real housing capital loss are likely to save more
in order to offset such loss. In addition to the empirical evidences discussed
above, the theoretical model proposed by Hu (2005) also suggests that a higher
exogenous moving rate (such like a higher probability of forced move) should
induce more precautionary savings.
Second, this paper provides supporting evidence on precautionary savings
motive in China. Previous literature suggests that precautionary savings mo-
tive is a potential explanation to the increasing household savings rate in China
(Meng 2003; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006; Chamon and Prasad 2010; Giles and
Yoo 2007; Feng, He and Sato 2011). Several factors, such as increases in educa-
tion, health and housing expenditure, and uncertainty in pension wealth have
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been suggested to induce precautionary savings. However, there are no exist-
ing studies to examine precautionary savings motive due to home ownership
uncertainty.
The primary contribution of this chapter is that it documents the rising home
ownership insecurity problem in China and its macroeconomic consequences.
Since there is no official statistics on forced evictions in China, the dataset col-
lected from online news provides a great opportunity to unveil the distribution
of forced eviction and to study its consequences. Second, this paper adds to
the literature in understanding the causes of rising household savings rate in
China. In align with the hypothesis on precautionary savings, this paper pro-
vides robust empirical evidences suggesting that home ownership uncertainty
may explain some of the rising household savings rate in china.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides the institutional
background about increasing demolition in China; Section 4.3 introduces the
hypothesis to be tested, data sources, and identification strategies; Section 4.4
discusses the main findings; Section 4.5 shows the possible channels; and Sec-
tion 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Background of Home Demolition in China
Home demolition is an increasing concern in China accompanied with the rapid
growth of infrastructure investment and urbanization process. According to
the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) conducted in year 2011, 8.7% of
the surveyed urban households have experienced home demolition since year
2000, with an average of 129.15 square meters being demolished (see Table B.25).
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The average monetary compensation is around 276.8 thousands yuan, which is
more than 11 times of the average urban household income in 2011. 1 How-
ever, it seems that the households being demolished are not very satisfied with
their compensation. Around half of the households are not satisfied (or very un-
satisfied) with the amount being compensated. 4.73% of the households even
received nothing for the demolition.
More households in eastern China (11.54%) have experienced home demo-
lition than households in central and western China (5.03%), with significantly
more areas being demolished. Since housing price is generally higher in eastern
China, the average monetary compensation in the east is more than three times
as of the compensation in central and western China. However, the share of
households unsatisfied with the compensation is not significantly lower in the
east. One possible reason is that the money being compensated cannot match
the average housing price in both the east and the central and western China.2
When home owners cannot reach an agreement with the party initiating de-
molition, such as property developers, conflicts arise. Some households refused
to move even the real estate projects began around them, which resulted in
forced evictions. Such conflicts sometimes evolved into violent incidents and
brought media attention.3 In the past decade, the incidences of forced evictions
have been increasing dramatically both at the intensive (more cases in the same
area) and extensive (more areas being affected) margin. The number of news
1The average urban household income is 23,979 yuan in 2011, according to the China Statis-
tical Yearbook 2012.
2According to the survey team, the compensation to housing value ratio is around 0.8
in the east, 0.87 and 0.89 in central and western China. (The full report is available at
http://money.163.com/13/0325/09/8QQ8K7C7002534M5.html)
3For example, Wall Street Journal reported a mapping project about violent forced evictions
in China: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/10/29/chinas-blood-stained-property-
map/
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about forced evictions by searching Baidu News Archive, the world’s largest
Chinese news search engine, rose from 307 in 2004 to 125,000 in 2012.
4.3 Hypothesis, Data Sources, and Identification Strategies
4.3.1 Hypothesis
This chapter tries to understand the macroeconomic consequences of forced
evictions. Specifically, being exposed to more forced evictions in a city in-
creases residents’ expectation of being evicted, which lowers the expected hous-
ing wealth since the compensation for demolition (if there is any) is usually be-
low market value. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formed: more forced
evictions in a city reported through media subsequently increases urban house-
holds’ precautionary savings motive in that city, in order to offset the expected
housing capital loss. In this paper, I only focus on urban households since they
have easy access to media. The rural households may not have access to news-
papers and internet, thus unlikely respond to media reporting of forced evic-
tions.
4.3.2 Data Sources
The study will be carried out at the prefecture city level due to the type of data
available for use.
Forced evictions
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One of the key variables in this study is the level of home ownership inse-
curity being perceived by the households for each city in different years, which
is indexed by the number of news about forced evictions in a certain city be-
ing reported yearly searched from Baidu News Archive. 4For example, the re-
sulted number of news by searching news titles containing“forced eviction” and
“Guangzhou” from January 1st, 2010 to December, 31st, 2010 is 1,280. There-
fore, the index for home ownership insecurity in Guangzhou in 2010 is 1,280.
The larger the value suggests the worse the level of home ownership insecurity
in a city in a certain year.
Since no published statistics in China reveals the incidence of forced evic-
tion, media coverage is the best available resort to learn about forced evictions
from the residents’ perspectives. However, there may be several concerns re-
garding the manner that forced eviction is defined. First, it is likely that some
forced evictions are not reported due to media censorship in China. However,
this is less of a concern since households respond only to information they are
exposed to about forced eviction, if there is any causal responses. Most people
collect information from local newspapers, television news and internet, which
is covered by Baidu News Archive. Therefore, the forced evictions being cen-
sored, without known to the public, only affect the information collected by
the witnesses and victims of such events, which should be a rather tiny group
relative to the city population.
Second, the level of media censorship may vary by cities, which suggests
that institutional differences in cities may affect the number of news being re-
ported about forced eviction. For example, in more liberal cities in China, local
4There is a growing trend of collecting data from online resources in social science research,
such as Google Trends (Choi and Varian 2012; Vosen and Schmidt 2011; Askitas and Zimmer-
mann 2009).
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government may not be very sensitive about releasing forced eviction news to
the public, so most of the forced eviction events may have been reported in
those areas. In contrast, a conservative local government may impose more
censorship on forced eviction news, so the cases of forced evictions being re-
ported may be much less than it actually is. Such institutional differences in
cities may bias the number of news being collected about forced evictions in
different cities, which may also affect household savings rate in some ways. For
example, it is possible that more liberal cities generally have higher GDP and
personal income, so people save more. In order to deal with such concerns,
city level economic and demographic indicators, such as GDP, fixed asset in-
vestment and population are controlled in the model when studying the causal
impact between forced evictions and household savings rate. It is rather un-
likely that non-economic factors correlated with institutional differences, such
as local government ideologies, will affect household savings rate. However,
I try to capture such factors through controlling some institutional variables as
well. Third, one event of forced eviction may correspond to more than one news
titles from the Baidu News Archive. However, this works in favor of the ques-
tion to be addressed in the paper since more media attention indicates more
informed the population is. Therefore, the counts of news titles on forced evic-
tion essentially combine the number of forced eviction cases and the attention
of such events among the public.
In order to reach a robust conclusion that insecure home ownership induces
household saving behavior, I use two alternative measures of forced evictions
as robustness checks. First, I further refine the searching criteria of forced evic-
tion news in Baidu News Archives. In addition to the two key words “forced
eviction” and city name, I further exclude the key word “demolition” from the
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searching criteria since Baidu search engine takes “demolition” as a synonym
for “forced eviction”, thus include the news titles containing “demolition” in
the returned results as well. Second, I normalize the forced eviction index by
the total population of the city. Intuitively, the normalized index measures the
probability of being evicted in the city.
Household savings rate
Another key variable used in this study is household savings rate in prefec-
ture level cities. Household savings rate in the prefecture city level is defined as
1-average per capita consumption expenditure/average per capita disposable
income. The consumption and income data is collected from CEIC database
which only includes the urban households. The data is sourced from National
Bureau of Statistics (China). Other city statistics, such as GDP, fixed asset in-
vestment and population, is collected from China Economic and Social Devel-
opment Statistical Database,5 and the data source is China Statistical Yearbooks
in various years. Since Baidu News Archive does not contain information prior
to November 2003, the years relevant to this study span from 2004 to 2011.
Descriptions of key variables
Figure A.13 and A.14 shows the map series of media reports about forced
eviction in 248 prefecture level cities in China in 2004 and 2011. Since the con-
sumption and income data is not available for most of the cities in western
China (mainly minority autonomous regions) in the CEIC dataset, the forced
eviction index is not collected for those cities which are shaded in grey in the
maps. However, the sample is still representative for China since 248 out of 283
5The database is available at http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Dig/dig.aspx with institutional
access.
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prefecture level cities have been included. It is clearly shown from the maps
that the incidences of forced evictions have been increasing dramatically both
at the extensive and intensive margin in the past eight years. Only 56 out of
248 cities were reported about forced eviction in 2004, while 203 cities had at
least one piece of news about forced eviction in 2011. Among the cities being
reported for forced eviction, the average number of news rose from 3.14 in 2004
to 27.33 in 2011, which grew almost 9 times.
Table B.26 describes the source of data, unit of measurement, as well as sum-
mary statistics for several key variables. The average household savings rate is
28.3 percent from 2004 to 2011, with a standard deviation of 6.76. However, the
variation of forced eviction across cities is much larger. The average number of
news being reported is 7.54 for a prefecture level city on an annual basis, but
the standard deviation is 44.47. Guangzhou reported 1,280 pieces of news on
forced eviction in 2010, the largest among all the observations. The average city
in China has a GDP of 105.6 billion yuan, fixed asset investment of 37.5 billion
yuan and total population around 4.3 million. Figure A.15 shows the growth
trend of urban household savings rate and reported forced evictions from 2004
to 2011, both of which are rising over years.
4.3.3 Identification Strategies
The dataset to be estimated is a panel data consisting of 248 prefecture level
cities in China and eight years (2004-2011). Since household savings rate is path
dependent, it is necessary to include lagged savings rate in year t − p (p > 0) to
explain the variation of savings rate in year t. Therefore, the traditional Ordi-
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nary Least Squares estimation with fixed effects can be specified as follows:
S avingsi,t =α + γ1S avingsi,t−1 + · · · + γpS avingsi,t−p + β ln FEi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + σi + i,t
(4.1)
However, the Ordinary Least Squares estimation with city fixed effects leads
to biased coefficients due to the correlation between the demeaned lagged de-
pendent variable and the error term, especially in the “small T, large N” context
(Nickell, 1981). Therefore, the empirical specification here applies the Differ-
ence GMM estimation, which is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Specif-
ically, Arellano and Bond (1991) take the first difference of both dependent and
independent variables of a panel dataset to get rid of the time-invariant coun-
try (city) specific characteristics. In addition, the lagged differenced dependent
variable (savings rate) of order p is included in the right-hand side of the equa-
tion if we assume the dependent variable follows an AR(p) process. The equa-
tion to be estimated by the Arellano-Bond estimator is specified as follows:
∆S avingsi,t = α + γ1∆S avingsi,t−1 + · · · + γp∆S avingsi,t−p + β∆ ln FEi,t−1 + δ∆Xi,t−1 + ∆i,t
(4.2)
where S avingsi,t is the average urban household savings rate in city i, time t;
ln FEi,t−1 is the log value of forced eviction index in city i, time t; Xi,t is other city
economic and demographic statistics which may affect savings rate, including
GDP, fixed asset investment, population and foreign direct investment in log
forms. Specifically, GDP and population control for the size of the economy.
Fixed asset investment controls for the size of the real estate sector which is
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likely to be correlated with housing price, and thus savings rate. Ideally, hous-
ing price should be controlled in the savings equation. However, since there
is no data available for historical housing prices in China, I use fixed asset in-
vestment to proxy for housing prices at the city level. Foreign direct investment
controls for the institutional differences across cities. As mentioned in Section
4.3, institutional differences in cities, such as openness, may affect the number
of news being reported about forced eviction. Therefore I include foreign direct
investment to control for the potential differences in terms of openness of a city.
Finally, i,t is the error term.
Since S avingsi,t−p is correlated with the error term ∆i,t only when p=1, the
Arellano-Bond estimator uses S avingsi,t−p (p ≥ 2) to instrument ∆S avingsi,t−1
which eliminate the estimation bias due to the correlation between lagged de-
pendent variable and the error term. β is the coefficient of interest, which in-
dicates the impact of insecure home ownership in period t − 1 on household
savings rate in period t.
Two specification tests are to be carried out to test the validity of the models.
First, the Sargan test statistics will be reported to test the identification restric-
tions, with the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Second, the first-
and second-order serial correlation test statistics will be reported to test the hy-
pothesis that the error term is not serially correlated. If the model is correctly
specified, the first-order serial correlation test should reject the null hypothesis
while the second-order serial correlation test should not reject the null.
If the dependent variable is highly persistent over time (similar to a ran-
dom walk), then the lagged dependent variables become weak instruments for
differenced lags. Thus the Difference GMM estimation suffers from finite sam-
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ple bias. In order to deal with this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the System GMM estimation that combines
regressions both in differences and in levels into one system. However, the Dif-
ference GMM estimation is a preferred specification in this paper suggested by
the specification tests. 6 Moreover, the dependent variable in our dataset does
not contain unit root indicated from several unit root tests on panel data. 7
4.4 Findings
Before diving into the Difference GMM estimation results, Table B.26 exploits
the potential factors which affect the incidence of forced evictions. The depen-
dent variable is the incidence of forced evictions in log form, while explanatory
variables include lagged values of GDP, fixed asset investment, total population
and foreign direct investment in log forms, as well as dummies for whether a
city is provincial capital or municipality, year fixed effects and province fixed
effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. Column 1-
4 controls for the four lagged economic variables one at a time, and column 5
controls for all of the four economic variables and other explanatory variables
mentioned above. It can be seen from the first four columns that higher GDP
and population, more fixed asset investment and foreign direct investment are
6Table B.32 provides the results for System GMM estimation. However, 5 out of the 15 mod-
els cannot pass the Sargan Test; none of the models pass the first order serial correlation test;
and 5 models cannot pass the second order serial correlation test. Therefore the System GMM
models are likely to be mis-specified.
7The Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test (Levin et al., 2002) and Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test (Har-
ris and Tzavalis, 1999) are two tests with null hypothesis that “panels contain unit roots”. The
test statistics in both tests reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. The Hadri LM test (Hadri,
2000) is based on the null hypothesis that “all panels are stationary” and the alternative hypoth-
esis as “some panels contain unit roots”. The test statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis at
the 0.05 level. Therefore, all the evidences suggest that the savings data does not contain unit
root.
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all significantly positive correlated with more forced evictions in the next year in
a certain city. However, when the four variables are controlled at the same time,
GDP is the only dominant factor significantly affecting forced evictions, while
other three variables are no longer significant. In addition, provincial capitals
and municipalities are significantly associated with more forced evictions com-
paring to other cities.
Table B.27-B.29 report the impact of reported forced evictions on urban
household savings rate using three different forced eviction measures. All re-
gressions are estimated using the Arellano-Bond Estimator following Equation
(4.1). The covariates enter into the model with different assumptions in Panel
A and Panel B. Panel A assumes all the right hand side variables to be strictly
exogenous, while Panel B relaxes the restrictions by assuming all the right hand
side variables to be endogenous. For each panel, there are five specifications
including different sets of control variables. In addition to the coefficients on
forced evictions, the number of instruments and the statistics on the two speci-
fication tests are also reported in the tables.
Table B.27 reports the estimated coefficient of interest, β, using the first mea-
sure of reported forced eviction, i.e., the logged value of returned number of
news by searching keywords “forced eviction” and the city name within a cer-
tain year. The coefficients in all the five specifications in Panel A are positive
and significant at the 0.05 level with a magnitude between 0.39 and 0.41. This
suggests that worse insecurity of home ownership, as indicated by higher forced
eviction index, leads to higher household savings rate at the prefecture city level
in the subsequent year. Panel B reports more conservative estimation assuming
all the right-hand-side variables to be endogenous. Three out of the five coef-
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ficients are positive and significant at the 0.10 level with a magnitude between
0.67 and 0.88. More specifically, if the forced eviction index is increased by the
average annual growth rate suggested from the data, 161%, urban household
savings rate is expected to increase by 0.64 to 0.84 percent. In addition, the null
hypothesis of the Sargan test cannot be rejected for all the ten specifications in
Table B.27, supporting the statement that the specifications in the dynamic panel
data model are not overidentified. Similarly, the serial correlation test suggests
that the lagged error terms are not correlated, which satisfies the assumption of
the Arellano-Bond estimator. 8
Table B.28 presents the results using the second measure of reported forced
eviction, which filters out the key word “demolition” from the first measure.
Again, all the coefficients on reported forced evictions are positive. However,
the number of significant coefficients (at the 0.05 level) decreases, especially for
the model assuming strict exogeneity for all the covariates. Only one of the co-
efficients in Panel A is significant at the 0.10 level. The other four coefficients
are marginally significant though. The estimated coefficients in Panel B are sim-
ilar to the counterparts in Table B.27. Again, all the specification tests in Table 5
support the validity of the model.
Table B.29 shows the estimation results using the third way of measuring
reported forced eviction, which is the first measure normalized by population
of the city, representing the probability of being evicted in the city. All the five
coefficients in Panel A are positive and significant at the 0.01 level, which is
consistent with the findings in Table B.27 and B.28. However, all the coefficients
lose their significance after applying more conservative estimation in Panel B,
8If the lagged error terms are not correlated, the first order serial correlation test should
always be rejected, and the second order serial correlation test should not be rejected.
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which indicates that the estimation using normalized reported forced evictions
is not robust across different model settings. Such fact reflects the possibility
that households are more responsive to the absolute number of news being re-
ported instead of taking care of the population size in the city.
To summarize, the estimation results in Table B.27-B.29 supports the hypoth-
esis that more forced evictions in a city reported through media subsequently
increases urban households’ precautionary savings motive in that city. The re-
sults are robust to different measures of forced evictions at the absolute value,
and are consistent across various specifications.
4.5 Possible Mechanisms
As mentioned in the introduction section, there are two possible mechanisms
which may lead to the impact of forced evictions on household savings rate.
First, it is likely that the impact of forced evictions on household savings rate
works directly through a reduction in home sales. If forced evictions discour-
age home sales, it may increase the average household savings rate in the city
due to delayed home purchase. It is also likely that the impact of forced evic-
tions works through the precautionary savings behavior of the home-owners,
since they are likely to receive less compensation than the market value of their
properties if being evicted.
I test the first channel by estimating the impact of forced evictions on resi-
dential floor area sold in the cities using the same difference GMM specification.
As suggested in Table B.30, I find that increases in forced evictions significantly
discouraged home sales. Among the ten coefficients on forced evictions using
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the first two measures of forced eviction indices, seven of them are significantly
negative, which provides supporting evidence to the first channel.
In order to test the second channel related to precautionary savings behav-
ior, I estimate the impact of reported forced evictions using two restricted sam-
ples where compensation for evictions is likely to be lower, since households
may worry more about the devaluation of housing assets thus engage more in
precautionary savings in cities being compensated less from forced evictions.
Therefore, in Table B.31, Panel A, I restrict the sample to cities in central and
western China. According to the CHFS survey (Table B.24), the compensation
about home demolition is far less in central and western China than in east-
ern China. Therefore, the magnitude of forced eviction’s impact on savings is
likely to be larger in central and western China compared to the full sample.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients on three measures of forced evic-
tions is consistently larger than the corresponding estimates in Panel B of Table
B.27-B.29, which works in favor with the above hypothesis.
In some major cities in China, such as provincial capitals, government may
be willing to pay higher compensation to the evicted households to avoid possi-
ble social unrest due to forced evictions. In this regard, forced evictions may not
lead to precautionary savings behaviors. Therefore, I exclude all the provincial
capitals from the sample in Panel B. Again, the magnitudes of all the estimated
coefficients for the first two measures of forced evictions are generally larger
than the coefficients estimated from the full sample. The coefficients on the nor-
malized measure of forced evictions are not significant, which is consistent with
the estimated results in Panel B of Table B.29. Overall, the robustness checks
in Table B.31 suggest that the precautionary savings motive driven by reported
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forced evictions is more pronounced in cities where the compensation for evic-
tions is less.
4.6 Conclusion
Using a unique dataset collected from online news coverage, I provide some
suggestive evidences about the causation between rising home insecurity, as
measured by the reported incidence of forced eviction, and rising urban house-
hold savings rate in China. By applying dynamic panel data models, I find that
worse insecurity of home ownership, as indicated by more frequent forced evic-
tions, leads to higher urban household savings rate at the prefecture city level
in the following year. This impact is likely to be attributed to the discouraged
home sale due to forced evictions, and the precautionary savings behavior of
home owners due to less compensation from forced evictions.
The empirical findings in this chapter imply that home ownership uncer-
tainty plays a role in explaining the rising savings rate in China, which is consis-
tent with the precautionary savings motive. Therefore, improved enforcement
on home ownership protection not only reduces social conflicts due to forced
evictions, but also has its macroeconomic implications. Since China stresses
boosting consumption as one of its long term economic growth strategies, the
government should reduce the barriers preventing people from spending their
money, such like insecure property ownership as discussed in this chapter.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES
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Figure A.1: The Decreasing Trend of Passenger Train Stations (1996-2009)
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Figure A.5: Railway Accessibility and Railway Length (1996-2009)
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Figure A.6: Average Daily Train Stops by City and County (1996-2009)
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Figure A.9: Event Study: The Impact of High-Speed Rail Upgrade on Af-
fected Counties
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Figure A.10: Map of China
Source: China Data Center (University of Michigan).
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Figure A.11: Map of Guizhou Province with road network
Source: China Data Center (University of Michigan).
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Figure A.12: Income per capita of counties in Guizhou (year 2008)
Source: China Data Center (University of Michigan).
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Figure A.13: Reported Forced Evictions in China in 2004
Note: Forced eviction index is defined as the number of news titles including
key words “forced eviction” + “city name” in Baidu News Archives each year.
Grey areas are the cities without statistical data on savings rate.
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Figure A.14: Reported Forced Evictions in China in 2011
Note: Forced eviction index is defined as the number of news titles including
key words “forced eviction” + “city name” in Baidu News Archives each year.
Grey areas are the cities without statistical data on savings rate.
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Figure A.15: Trend of Forced Eviction and Household Savings Rate:2004-
2011
Note: Forced eviction index is defined as the number of news titles including
key words “forced eviction” + “city name” in Baidu News Archives each year.
Urban household savings rate is defined as 1-expenditure/disposable income,
collected from CEIC database.
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Table B.2: The Impact of High-Speed Rail on County Economic Outcomes
(OLS)
93
Table B.3: The Impact of High-Speed Rail on County Economic Outcomes
(Reduced Form)
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Table B.4: The Impact of High-Speed Rail on County Economic Outcomes
(2SLS)
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Table B.5: The Impact of High-Speed Rail on County Economic Outcomes
(OLS, Collapsed Data)
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Table B.6: The Impact of High-Speed Rail on County Economic Outcomes
(2SLS, Collapsed Data)
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Table B.8: Heterogeneous Impacts of High-Speed Rail Upgrade in Differ-
ent Sectors
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Table B.9: The Impact of High-Speed Rail Upgrade Interacted with Dis-
tance to High-Speed Train Station
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Table B.10: Channels: Increased Trade Cost in Affected Counties (2005-
2009)
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Table B.11: Channels: Diverted Economic Activities to Large Cities (2005-
2009)
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Table B.14: The Impact of High-Speed Rail Upgrade in Different Service
Industries
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Table B.15: Road Access in Three Surveyed Villages
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Table B.16: Agricultural Income Sources in Three Surveyed Villages
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Table B.17: Summary Statistics of Key Variables in Four Waves
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Table B.18: Summary Statistics of Key Variables Between Villages by Road
Access
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Table B.20: Impact of Road Access on Income
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Table B.21: Impact of Road Access on Agricultural Production (Placebo
Test using Observations without Road Access)
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Table B.22: Impact of Road Access on Poverty Reduction (Aggregate Data
at the Natural Village Level)
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Table B.23: Robustness Checks on Area Based Specialization Index and
Crop Yields
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Table B.24: Summary of Statistics about Home Demolition from House-
hold Survey
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Table B.25: Summary of Statistics
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Table B.26: Factors Affecting Forced Evictions
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Table B.27: The Impact of Reported Forced Evictions on Household Sav-
ings Rate (Difference GMM Estimator)
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Table B.28: The Impact of Reported Forced Evictions on Household Sav-
ings Rate (Difference GMM Estimator, Alternative Measure)
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Table B.29: The Impact of Reported Forced Evictions on Household Sav-
ings Rate (Difference GMM Estimator, Normalized Measure)
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Table B.30: The Impact of Forced Eviction on Home Sale (Differenced
GMM)
121
Table B.31: The Impact of Reported Forced Evictions on Household Sav-
ings Rate (Difference GMM Estimator, Restricted Sample)
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Table B.32: The Impact of Reported Forced Evictions on Household Sav-
ings Rate (System GMM Estimator)
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